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Abstract 
 
The United Nations has been involved in peacekeeping operations since its establishment in 
1945. The international organization has been trying to maintain international peace and 
security, but has not always been successful in achieving this objective. This points to differing 
degrees of institutional capacity, i.e. the ability to implement the rules, structures and 
procedures to achieve the expected results. The current study analyzes how external factors 
influence this institutional capacity. To investigate this capacity of the UN, a small-N 
comparative case-study research is conducted through an analysis of the role of the UN in the 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. These programs have been 
implemented as part of peacekeeping missions to reintegrate former (child) combatants. It 
examines Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi. The research 
focuses on how three external factors, legitimacy, the availability of resources, and symmetry 
of power, are expected to influence the UN’s institutional capacity. It shows the importance of 
legitimacy and symmetry of power, while the availability of resources has limited influence on 
the degree of institutional capacity. In addition, it demonstrates how political will impacts all 
three external factors under study.  
 Keywords: United Nations; institutional capacity; peacekeeping operations; 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs  
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
Below is a list of all abbreviations used in this research. Most of the abbreviations are actors 
that participate in the conflict and/or DDR program. Therefore, to clarify, the country to which 
the actor belongs to is given in parentheses behind the abbreviation.  
 
AFDL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
AFRC   Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone) 
BINUB  UN Integrated Office in Burundi 
CONADER National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) 
CNDD-FDD National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the 
Defense of Democracy (Burundi) 
CNDRR National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and 
Reintegration (Burundi) 
CPA   Child Protection Advisor 
DDR   Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration  
DRC   Democratic Republic of the Congo 
FAB   Burundi Armed Forces (Burundi) 
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) 
FDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) 
FNL   National Forces of Liberation (Burundi) 
MDRP  Multi-Donor Reintegration Program 
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
MLC Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) 
NCDDR National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (Sierra Leone) 
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NDF National Defense Forces (Burundi) 
NGO   Non-governmental organization 
ONUB   UN Operation in Burundi 
Palipehutu-FNL Party for the Liberation of Hutu People-National Forces of Liberation 
(Burundi) 
RCD-Goma  Congolese Rally for Democracy (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
RUF   Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) 
SNES   National Structure of Child Soldiers (Burundi) 
UN   United Nations 
UNAMSIL  United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNOMSIL  United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
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Introduction 
 
Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations (UN) has been involved in peacekeeping 
operations around the world “to maintain international peace and security” (United Nations, 
1945: art. 1, para. 1). The UN as a third-party can positively influence the post-conflict 
transition to peace (see Fortna, 2004; Mason et al., 2011). Conflict-ridden countries are often 
unable to negotiate a peace agreement without a third-party intervention. The UN, as the 
international organization established to maintain international peace and security, is often the 
most appropriate third party to intervene and to support a country’s transition to peace. The 
historic record demonstrates successful cases, such as East Timor and Kosovo, but also major 
failures, such as Rwanda (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000: 779; Weiss et al., 2014: 85-86, 122). As 
an organization, the UN is not always able to achieve the results its policies aims for. This 
points to differing degrees of institutional capacity. This concept can be defined in several 
ways, but this study uses the following definition: the ability to implement rules, structures and 
procedures to achieve the expected results (see Bowen & Zwi, 2005; North, 1991; Honadle 
1981, Grindle & Hilderbrand 1995). While there are many possible factors that influence the 
degree of institutional capacity, such as internal aspects of the international organization, this 
research focuses on the external components since these factors are widespread in conflict 
situations. The UN has to navigate tensions between actors and has to face many challenges 
when it decides to intervene in conflicts or peace transitions. It is expected that these 
externalities impact the ability of the international organization to achieve its expected goals. 
Therefore, the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters tries to find an answer to the 
question: To what extent do external factors influence the degree of the UN’s institutional 
capacity?  
The study utilizes the case of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
programs to research institutional capacity. It demonstrates how legitimacy, the availability of 
resources, and the degree of symmetry of power as external factors are expected to influence 
the degree of institutional capacity. However, research reveals that legitimacy and symmetry 
of power are the main external factors influencing the ability of the United Nations to 
implements its rules, structures and procedures to achieve the expected results. The availability 
of resources does not significantly influence this ability due to consistency across cases. It is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition: the UN is not able implement any of its policies to 
achieve the expected results without sufficient resources. The research also points to the 
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importance of political will as an overlapping concept that is part of all three external factors 
and therefore influences the institutional capacity of the United Nations.  
 
Social and academic relevance 
The conclusions about the influence of external factors on the institutional capacity of the UN 
are relevant socially and academically. The research can contribute to the discussions about the 
success rate of the world organization. Once it is known what limits or promote the capacity 
of the UN to successfully respond to the world’s problems, then it is also known in which areas 
the organization can improve. In addition, the research also fills a gap in the literature. The UN 
has tried to succeed in supporting a country’s progress from war to peace through 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. The academic literature 
shows that ex-combatants, especially former child soldiers, are a vulnerable group after a 
conflict has ended and successfully reintegrating them into society produces a more durable 
peace (see Haer, 2016: 2; Haer & Böhmelt, 2016a: 426; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007: 531-
32; Walter, 2004: 371-74). Therefore, the DDR programs have been the subject of many policy 
evaluations and academic articles. However, the primary focus is almost always on the social, 
economic, or psychological perspective of the issue at hand; for example, the effects of child 
soldiers on the communities, the economic opportunities of the former combatants, or their 
mental health (see Annan, Brier & Aryemo, 2009; Blattman & Annan, 2010; Boothby, 
Crawford & Halperin, 2006; Haer & Böhmelt, 2016a). The institutional structure of the UN, 
as one of the actors involved in the DDR programs, has not been thoroughly analyzed so far. 
Therefore, this research tries to address this gap in the literature through an examination of 
institutional capacity of the UN. The institutional perspective utilized in this research about the 
influence of the external factors can contribute to social and academic discussions about the 
United Nations and its role in the international politics.  
 
Research design 
The research utilizes a comparative case-study design in which the DDR program in Sierra 
Leone is compared to the program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The cases 
are selected according to a most similar systems designs. The cases differ in their main 
explanatory variables, but remain constant across possible confounding variables such as the 
nature of the conflict. In an attempt to generalize the findings, Burundi is examined as a third 
case. The dependent variable under study is the institutional capacity of the UN, while the main 
independent variables are legitimacy, the availability of resources, and the degree of symmetry 
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of power. The research uses a variety of sources to secure triangulation: policy documents, 
grey literature, academic articles, and statistics. The method used to measure the influence of 
the independent variables on the dependent variable is policy evaluation in combination with 
process-tracing. The expected policy outcome is compared to the actual policy outcome based 
on the policy output. The policy output in the countries is the UN’s role in the DDR program, 
while the policy outcome is the degree of institutional capacity of the UN. It looks at whether 
the UN has accomplished its objectives and whether conflict has recurred or not. Process-
tracing enables the research to illustrate the causal mechanisms at work that influence the 
policy outcome. The combination of policy evaluation and process tracing allows the 
examination and comparison of the results of the DDR program in Sierra Leone, the DRC and 
Burundi to determine the external factors that influence the institutional capacity of the UN.  
 
Chapter overview 
The results of the research are presented in the subsequent chapters and are structured as 
follows. Chapter 1 focuses on the theoretical framework. It introduces institutional theory and 
focuses on the possible determinants of the institutional capacity of the United Nations. This 
results in three hypotheses concentrated around the concepts of legitimacy, the availability of 
resources and symmetry of power, which are expected to determine the degree of institutional 
capacity of the UN. The next chapter elaborates on the research approach and methods. Chapter 
3 illustrates the UN’s role in the DDR program in Sierra Leone, the DRC and Burundi. Chapter 
4 presents the analysis and application of the theoretical framework to the cases under study. 
It shows how legitimacy and symmetry of power influences the institutional capacity of the 
UN, while the availability of research has a limited effect. It also demonstrates that political 
will impacts all three external factors. Finally, the conclusion provides an overview of the data 
presented and the arguments made. It demonstrates the influence of legitimacy, the availability 
of resources, and the degree of symmetry of power on the institutional capacity of the UN and 
proposes further avenues of research.  
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
To analyze the influence of external factors on the institutional capacity of the United Nations, 
the subject under study needs to be contextualized in the wider academic literature. The focus 
is on institutional theory and the concept of institutional capacity. How can we define 
institutional capacity? And more crucially, how does institutional capacity relate to 
international organizations? Within the international community, multiple institutions are 
engaged, but this research concentrates on the United Nations as the involved third party. The 
analysis of the academic literature considers the concepts of legitimacy, availability of 
resources and symmetry of power. It demonstrates how these three pillars are expected to 
determine the degree of institutional capacity of the UN. 
 
1.1 Institutional theory and institutional capacity 
To examine the institutional capacity of the United Nations, a closer look at institutional theory 
is appropriate. In accordance with March & Olson (1984), society influences political 
institutions, but these institutions are also able to influence the political sphere themselves. 
This influence is determined by how they are designed. They are as much political actors as 
the society. As a result, political outcomes are determined by “the distribution of preferences 
(interests) among political actors, the distribution of resources (powers), and the constraints 
imposed by the rules of the game (constitutions)” (March & Olson, 1984: 738-39). These three 
aspects are the basis of how the external factors that are expected to influence the institutional 
capacity of the United Nations are determined. This institutional thinking allows for an analysis 
of how institutional structures impose “elements of order on a potentially inchoate world”, in 
the words of March & Olson (1984: 743). The question remains whether the UN can execute 
these elements of order to accomplish its aim of maintaining international peace and security.  
 Before the possible external factors are elaborated on, it is important to clarify the 
concept of institutions. Scholars have tried to come up with encompassing definitions of 
institutions. Bush (1987) illustrates institutions as “a set of socially prescribed patterns of 
correlated behavior” (1076). Values are an important mechanism in this definition as they 
determine how the behavior is judged and correlated. Institutions as such are a value structure. 
This definition fails to categorize distinct aspects of an institutional structure. In contrast, North 
(1991) defines the concept more concretely. He explains that “institutions are the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of 
both informal constraints and formal rules” (97). North (1991) also demonstrates that 
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institutions have been created to produce order, in favor of uncertainty. This corresponds to 
March & Olson’s (1984) argument. In other words, institutions are informal and formal rules, 
structures and processes that guide political, economic and social interactions. They can either 
promote or prevent this interaction between actors. The UN system that was founded based on 
the Charter and other protocols, conventions, etc., is the institution, whereas, for example, the 
UN agencies, such as the Security Council, are actors that participate in a certain interaction.  
Because of this definition of institutions, the actors involved in conflict resolution 
cannot be defined as institutions in this study. They have to navigate the institutional UN 
system, but are not institutions themselves. In this research, the UN system refers to the 
institutional framework, whereas the United Nations refers to the actor that has to navigate this 
institutional framework. It encompasses the Security Council, the General Assembly, the 
peacekeeping operations, and agencies such as UNICEF. In a hierarchical order, the UN is then 
at the same level as local armed groups, national governments, etc. These parties are actors that 
are subjected to the institutional UN system. Therefore, the concept of institutional capacity is 
more appropriate when examining these parties, i.e. the ability to use the institutional 
framework to accomplish their objectives. Since the institutional side of the concept is already 
defined, it is only necessary to define the concept of capacity to explain institutional capacity. 
Honadle (1981) claims that “a capable organization has the capacity to achieve all kinds of 
results” (577). This interpretation does not clarify exactly what capacity entails, but it points to 
a result-driven approach. Another definition by Grindle & Hilderbrand (1995) illustrates that 
capacity is “the ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably” 
(445). This raises the question what is meant by effectively, efficiently and sustainably. Bowen 
& Zwi’s (2005) definition provides the answer as they simply state that “capacity refers to the 
ability to carry out stated objectives” (604). Combining these three academic interpretations, 
capacity can be defined as the ability of an actor to achieve the expected results. As a result, 
institutional capacity corresponds to the actors’ ability to use informal and formal rules, 
structures and processes to achieve the expected result.  
 
1.2 Institutional capacity and international organizations 
The concept of institutional capacity is relevant to international organizations, in particular the 
United Nations. From its founding, the UN was a state-sponsored institutional mechanism. 
This, however, does not mean that the history of UN actions illustrates a trajectory towards 
increasing effectiveness. In contrast, the capacity of the agencies and actors involved in the UN 
system to respond appropriately to international crises has not always been sufficient. Most 
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notably, the history of peacekeeping depicts a couple of major failures, such as Rwanda 
(Rosenau, 1995: 34-35). Therefore, it is useful to analyze the concept of institutional capacity 
in relation to the United Nations’ role in conflict resolution and conflict recurrence.  
 As explained earlier, political outcomes are determined by three factors: “the 
distribution of preferences (interests) among political actors, the distribution of resources 
(powers), and the constraints imposed by the rules of the game (constitutions)” (March & 
Olson, 1984: 738-39). Each of these factors are relevant for an analysis of the external factors 
influencing the institutional capacity of the United Nations, since the degree of institutional 
capacity can be categorized as a political outcome. The expected political outcome can differ 
from the actual political outcome. In the current study, it is investigated how the three factors 
formulated by March & Olson (1984) can be related to the United Nations and how they are 
expected to influence the institutional capacity of the world organization.  
 
1.2.1 Legitimacy 
In line with the theory developed by March & Olson (1984), the first factor that determines a 
political outcome is the distribution of interests among the actors involved. They claim that 
preferences develop within society and politics (March & Olson, 1984: 739). For the United 
Nations to be able to execute its policies and achieve its objectives, the political actors involved 
should prefer the organization over any other arrangement. This means that the UN must be 
viewed as the most legitimate actor. As Harland (2004) contends, international administrations, 
such as the UN, are always to a certain extent illegitimate in their nature as it goes against the 
self-determination of sovereignty. Even if the international organization’s policies are agreed 
upon by the people concerned, it is always an outside actor imposing its rule on a sovereign 
political actor (Harland, 2004: 15). However, Harland (2004) argues that the UN is “the least 
illegitimate of all possible outside actors” because of the extensive membership which forces 
the organization “to accommodate a broad spectrum of views and constituencies” (17). This 
demonstrates that without legitimacy, the United Nations will never be able to impose its 
policies on sovereign government and publics, thereby failing to achieve its goals. Therefore, 
legitimacy is expected to be an important determinant for institutional capacity. 
Legitimacy can be defined in a normative and sociological manner. The former focuses 
on the right to rule, while the latter concentrates on the belief that it is has the right to rule. 
Normative legitimacy is more appropriate in this context, because it is expected that the UN is 
only able to succeed in its goals if it has the actual right to rule (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006: 
405-07). This means that even if an outside actor does not agree with the actions of the 
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organization, it still subjects to the organization’s rule because of its legitimacy. It goes beyond 
mere support of the organization; it also implies a degree of compliance and political will 
(Buchanan & Keohane, 2006: 409-11). Buchanan & Keohane (2006) formulated criteria that 
an organization must fulfill to attain normative legitimacy. Ongoing consent of democratic 
states is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for legitimacy. In addition, there are three 
substantive factors that need to be considered. The first aspect is minimal moral acceptability. 
This means that an international organization should not commit serious injustices. The second 
factor is comparative benefit. This means that the international organization provides benefits 
that no other organization can provide. As soon as there is an alternative actor that meets the 
above requirements of legitimacy and does not provoke extreme transaction costs, the degree 
of legitimacy of the former actor decreases. The final aspect is institutional integrity, which 
focuses on a possible discrepancy between an organization’s actual performance and the 
procedures and goals it promotes. This includes scandals such as corruption, but also the 
inability of an international organization to pursue its fundamental goals. The higher an 
organization scores on each of these criteria, the more legitimate the organization is (Buchanan 
& Keohane, 2006: 417-24). Lastly, the organization also needs to be able to provide reliable 
information to the public to be legitimate. This relates to the degree of accountability and 
transparency of an international organization (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006: 425-26). These 
criteria can be summed up as the external factor of legitimacy and are expected to influence 
the UN’s institutional capacity. 
 
H1: The degree of legitimacy attributed to the UN by the parties involved is expected 
to influence the institutional capacity of the UN. 
 
1.2.2 Availability of resources 
The second aspect that determines a political outcome is the distribution of resources, 
according to March & Olson (1984). This factor relates to the effectiveness of an international 
organization. The political organizations determine the distribution of resources among 
political actors, which in turn affects the power of the political organizations (March & Olson, 
1984: 739). However, in international relations, the effectiveness of a political organization is 
also highly dependent on the contribution of resources by the political actors. As Woods (1999) 
explains, in the short term, effectiveness is about the ability of an organization “to make the 
relevant and necessary decisions, to muster the necessary resources and capabilities, and to 
apply resources to implementing and enforcing decisions” (42). She argues that an international 
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organization needs a few powerful states to be effective in the short-term (Woods, 1999: 43). 
Without the necessary resources, the UN is expected to be unable to achieve a high degree of 
institutional capacity. Resources include the contribution of military personnel, financial 
resources as well as the provision of expertise. Therefore, the availability of resources is the 
second external factor expected to influence the institutional capacity of the United Nations.  
 
H2: The availability of resources contributed by the parties involved is expected to 
influence the institutional capacity of the UN. 
 
1.2.3 Symmetry of power 
The last factor that influences political outcomes according to March & Olson (1984) are the 
constraints imposed by the rules of the game. They use constitutions as an example. Public 
organizations include rules in their institutional framework and then the political actors should 
execute these rules (739). In the current research, the rules of the game are determined by the 
structure of power that exists that could potentially promote or constrain the institutional 
capacity of the United Nations. This power structure includes the relationship between the 
United Nations and the other involved parties. Woods (1999) argues that symmetry of power 
results in long-term effectiveness. To achieve this, a more active and participatory membership 
should be established by incorporating the three principles of participation, accountability and 
fairness (Woods, 1999: 42-43). Participation relates to ownership: the parties that are affected 
by the decision made by the international organization should see the agreement not as an 
outside enforcement, but as an arrangement that has their own full support. Accountability 
requires transparency and flows of information to inform the actors involved about the 
decisions that are made. Finally, there are two types of fairness. First, procedural fairness 
emphasizes the equality of the institutional structure. Rules, procedures and standards are 
imposed equally on all actors involved. Second, substantive fairness has two aspects: the 
impartiality of the outcomes and a general symmetry of power, influence and resources within 
the organization (Woods, 1999: 44-46). To sum up, the final external factor that is expected to 
influence the institutional capacity of the United Nations is the degree of symmetry of power 
that exists.  
 
H3: The degree of symmetry of power among the parties involved is expected to 
influence the institutional capacity of the UN.  
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To conclude, the case studies that follow tests how legitimacy, the availability of resources, 
and the degree of symmetry of power influence the institutional capacity of the United Nations. 
At best, the United Nations is able to implement rules, structures and procedures to maintain 
international peace and security. This goal is idealistic and difficult to achieve. However, an 
analysis of the influence of the external factors on institutional capacity presents the 
opportunity to find ways to strengthen the institutional capacity in the future and to increase 
the chances of maintaining international peace and security. The figure below presents an 
overview of the theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework.  
 
  
Institutional capacity 
of the UN
Legitimacy
Availability of 
resources
Symmetry of power
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Chapter 2: Research Design 
 
To analyze the influence of external factors on the UN’s institutional capacity, DDR programs 
that include adult and child combatants are examined as a case-study because of its close 
relationship to the primary goals of the UN and the number of involved parties that the UN 
needs to cooperate with. DDR programs are established to break the so-called “conflict trap” 
by reintegrating former combatants into civilian life. Countries that experience war are more 
likely to experience a new war. An old conflict leads to a new conflict, resulting in a vicious 
cycle in which a country is not able to recover from war and to develop into a peaceful nation 
(Collier & Sambanis, 2002: 5). Research shows that the successful reintegration of former 
combatants, especially child soldiers, decreases the chance of conflict recurrence (Bakaki & 
Hinkkainen, 2016: 548-49; Haer & Böhmelt, 2016a: 408). Therefore, DDR programs are 
ultimately about maintaining peace and security, one of the primary objectives of the UN. 
However, the UN is not always able to achieve its goals since conflict recurs in some cases. 
This points to a lack of institutional capacity of the United Nations. Although the UN might 
not be able to create sustained peace, the involvement of the international community is 
important. Research shows that peace is more likely to endure when a third party is involved, 
even though the presence of the international community in a conflict is no guarantee (Fortna, 
2004: 288; Mason et al., 2011: 187). Therefore, a critical evaluation of the UN’s institutional 
capacity is necessary and the DDR programs designed to reintegrate adult and child combatants 
presents an interesting case due to its connection to the primary aims of the UN. In addition, 
many external factors influence the DDR programs due to the complexity of the conflicts and 
the number of involved parties in each case. Therefore, it can be categorized as one of the 
primary examples in which external factors influence the UN’s opportunity to accomplish its 
objectives.  
 
2.1 Data and variables 
The influence of external factors on the institutional capacity of the UN is examined by utilizing 
qualitative data in a small-N comparative design of three DDR programs to reintegrate (child) 
soldiers. The unit of analysis is a country. The population of the cases is defined as all countries 
that experienced UN intervention in DDR programs resulting in a degree of institutional 
capacity of the UN. The cases are selected using a most similar systems design (see Figure 2) 
(Toshkov, 2016: 262-266). Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
experienced different degrees of legitimacy and symmetry of power, even though the last main 
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explanatory variable, the availability of resources, is constant across the cases. In addition, 
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo experienced consistency across 
possible confounding variables: both countries were engaged in a civil war in which factions 
tried to gain governmental power. The conflict was ended through the signing of a peace and 
ceasefire agreement and a DDR program with a separate section on child soldiers and an UN 
peacekeeping force followed (Kreps, 2010: 90; Uppsala Data Conflict Program, 2015). This 
makes comparing the DDR programs easier as it limits the possibility of other factors 
influencing the institutional capacity of the UN. A third country, Burundi, was chosen to test 
the conclusions of the analysis of the first two countries and to make a step towards 
generalization of the arguments made in the research. Burundi has similar degrees of legitimacy 
and symmetry of power as Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, the other main explanatory variable, 
the availability of resources, remains constant across the cases. Burundi was also engaged in a 
civil war over governmental power which ended with the signing of a peace and ceasefire 
agreement. After, Burundi was subjected to a DDR program with a focus on child soldiers and 
an UN peacekeeping force (Uppsala Data Conflict Program, 2015). The data presented on 
Sierra Leone, the DRC and Burundi reveals the influence of external factors on the institutional 
capacity of the UN in DDR programs.  
 
Most similar systems design 
 Sierra 
Leone 
DRC Burundi 
Dependent variable: institutional capacity ? ? ? 
Main explanatory variable: legitimacy High Low High 
Main explanatory variable: availability of 
resources 
Sufficient Sufficient Sufficient 
Main explanatory variable: symmetry of 
power 
High Low High 
Possible confounding variable: nature of 
the conflict 
Civil war Civil war Civil war 
Possible confounding variable: motivation 
for the conflict 
To gain 
governmental 
power 
To gain 
governmental 
power 
To gain 
governmental 
power 
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Possible confounding variable: conflict 
ended with a peace and a ceasefire 
agreement 
Yes Yes Yes 
Possible confounding variable: presence 
of child soldiers 
Yes Yes Yes 
Possible confounding variable: DDR 
program with a focus on child soldiers 
Yes Yes Yes 
Figure 2. Most similar systems design. 
 
Within the framework of the most similar systems design, within-case analysis is used. 
The investigation of the countries is not focused on one dependent and one independent 
variable. Instead, multiple possible explanatory variables are examined (see Figure 3) 
(Toshkov, 2016: 285). The dependent variable under study is the institutional capacity of the 
United Nations. The current study is about how the main independent variables, legitimacy, 
availability of resources and the degree of symmetry of power, influence this dependent 
variable. Research on these external factors has the potential to be generalizable since the 
findings can be applied to other DDR programs (both to analyze past programs and to 
implement future programs). In addition, the results can be utilized in analyses of other 
domains in which the UN tries to promote international peace and security or even in 
examinations of other international organizations such as the World Bank. The variables are 
tested using different sources to secure triangulation. The primary benefit of triangulation is 
that the same problem is analyzed utilizing different methods. This increases the validity of the 
arguments (Toshkov, 2016: 313-14). Therefore, the data consists of policy documents from the 
United Nations and local governments, such as resolutions and peace agreements. This data is 
substantiated with academic and grey literature. This includes academic articles and policy 
reports by think tanks, NGOs or the United Nations. To add a third source of information and 
to add quantitative data, statistics are included. These are mainly provided by agencies such as 
the World Bank and NGOs. To clarify, the table on the next page presents the variables and 
operationalization of these variables.  
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Variables Definition Operationalization Data source 
Independent variables 
Legitimacy An organization has the right to 
rule and actors subject to its rule 
even though the actor in 
question might not agree with 
the actions taken by the 
organization (Buchanan & 
Keohane, 2006: 405-411). 
Ongoing consent of 
democratic states, 
minimal moral 
acceptability, 
comparative benefit, 
institutional integrity 
and accountability 
Academic 
literature, 
statistics, 
UNICEF reports, 
UN reports, 
reports from 
NGOs (for 
example, 
Amnesty 
International, 
Child Soldiers, 
and Coalition to 
Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers), 
Security Council 
resolutions and 
DDR policy 
documents (for 
example, MDRP 
reports and 
NCDDR reports) 
Availability 
of 
resources 
The ability of an organization 
“to make the relevant and 
necessary decisions, to muster 
the necessary resources and 
capabilities, and to apply 
resources to implementing and 
enforcing decisions” (Woods, 
1999: 42). 
The necessary 
resources compared to 
the actual resources 
contributed by the 
parties involved – 
financial resources, 
military resources and 
expertise  
Symmetry 
of power 
An active and participatory 
membership that agrees upon 
the rules, identity and decision-
making of the organization 
(Woods, 1999: 42-43). 
Participation, 
accountability and 
fairness 
Dependent variable 
Institutional 
capacity 
The ability of an actor to use 
informal and formal rules, 
structures and processes to 
achieve the expected result 
(Bowen & Zwi, 2005; North, 
1991; Honadle 1981, Grindle & 
Hilderbrand 1995) 
The degree of success 
of the policy output: 
expected policy 
outcome compared to 
the actual policy 
outcome 
Academic 
literature, 
statistics, 
UNICEF reports, 
NGO reports, 
UN resolutions 
and DDR policy 
documents 
Figure 3. Dependent and independent variables.  
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2.2 Research methods 
The research described in the earlier section follows the method of policy evaluation and 
process-tracing. As Pawson & Tilley (1997) explain, an evaluation includes the identification, 
articulation, testing and refinement of the context, mechanisms and the outcomes (77). The 
evaluation method used in the current research is a policy theory-driven evaluation. The policy 
output is compared to the policy outcome, considering the context of the situation in which the 
policy is implemented. Everything that occurs in the process from policy output to policy 
outcome are the mechanisms involved (De Peuter, De Smedt & Bouckaert, 2007: 93-97). The 
findings are then compared to the goals stated in the policy. These goals are the criteria of the 
evaluation. In this manner, policy evaluation can be defined as observing content, processes 
and effects of policy (Bresser & Hoogerwerf, 1995: 22). In the current research, the policy 
output is the UN’s role in the DDR program under study, while the policy outcome is the degree 
of institutional capacity of the organization based on whether conflict recurred or not and the 
success of the DDR program. Using this structure, high UN institutional capacity involves no 
conflict and a successful DDR program, while low UN institutional capacity includes the 
opposite. Policy evaluation inherently involves the method of process tracing: “to generate and 
analyze data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other 
intervening variables, that link putative causes to observed effects” (Bennett & George, 1997: 
5). In this method, research is done through descriptive and causal inference. The first aspect 
entails the identification of key moments and events that could influence the policy 
implementation. In the current study, Chapter 3 on the results of the research respond to this 
challenge. The second aspect, causal inference, requires the categorization of the evidence into 
whether it is a necessary and/or a sufficient condition. Evidence can either lead to a condition 
that is neither necessary nor sufficient (straw-in-the-wind test); a condition that is necessary 
but not sufficient (hoop test); a condition that is sufficient but not necessary (smoking-gun 
test); or a condition that is necessary and sufficient (doubly decisive test) (Collier, 2011: 824-
27). The analysis presented in Chapter 4 corresponds to the challenge of causal inference. The 
evidence used is framed using policy evaluation and process-tracing to establish the influence 
of external factors on the institutional capacity of the UN’s role.  
 
2.3 Limitations of the research 
The research is subjected to general limitations of comparative analysis based on a most similar 
systems design, as well as to specific limitations due to case selection and the data sources 
used. Comparative small-N studies face the challenge of measurement error and random 
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variation as a result of the limited number of cases under study. This also makes it more 
difficult to generalize the findings (Toshkov, 2016: 282-83). These limitations are taken into 
consideration in the analysis. The generalizability of the results is increased due to the addition 
of a third case, Burundi, to test the conclusions of the first two cases. However, unless all cases 
are considered in a large-N study, this problem remains. Besides these general limitations, the 
research is also subjected to challenges based on the case selection. The main explanatory 
variable, the availability of resources, is constant across cases, which makes it hard to explore 
the influence of this external factor on the institutional capacity of the UN. However, most of 
the possible cases included in the population have sufficient availability of resources. 
Therefore, it was decided that this would not cause a change in case selection in the hope that 
an in-depth analysis can shed more light on this consistency across the cases. In addition, even 
though Sierra Leone, the DRC and Burundi share similarities in the contextual factors, it should 
be taken into account that the DRC conflict is much more complex due to the regional aspect 
even though it is characterized as a civil war. Moreover, no interviews are conducted to narrow 
down the scope of the research. However, this also reduces the availability of data and excludes 
interesting evidence that could potentially alter the results. These limitations are taken into 
consideration when analyzing the results.  
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Chapter 3: Results 
 
The institutional capacity of the UN focuses on using formal and informal rules, procedures 
and structures to achieve the expected results: to maintain international peace and security. The 
efforts to prevent conflict from occurring is highly connected to the literature on conflict 
recurrence. Many countries are trapped in a vicious circle in which conflict creates new 
conflict. After civil wars, the economy continues to worsen, resulting in an increase in the 
likelihood of rebellion, driven by the already existing feelings of hatred. Once a country 
experienced a civil war, the chances that this conflict will recur are significant (Collier & 
Sambanis, 2002: 5). A further explanation for this is the argument presented by Doyle & 
Sambanis (2000). They claim that war returns if the benefits of war for particular (powerful) 
groups are higher than the benefits of peace. These perceived benefits differ across actors, but, 
in general, it depends on the intensity of harm experienced, the availability of resources to 
initiate development, and the degree of international support in a country’s reconstruction and 
process of development (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000: 780). This relates to the concept of multiple 
sovereignty (Tilly, 1977: 3-6). This means that an actor not only has to perceive that wartime 
is more beneficial than peacetime, but it also has the organizational capacity and popular 
support to act upon these benefits. Important indicators that determine the degree of multiple 
sovereignty are the level of economic development, the access to primary commodities such 
as gemstones and drugs, and the possibility for rebels to organize secure base camps for their 
operations (Quinn, Mason & Gurses, 2007: 168-73). In addition, the degree of multiple 
sovereignty that persists in a post-conflict environment is determined by the end of a civil war: 
was it a rebel victory, a government victory or a negotiated settlement? This affects the 
decisions made by rebel groups (Mason et al., 2011: 171-72). To sum up, many of the conflicts 
are subjected to the notion of conflict recurrence due to the hatred that exist in post-conflict 
societies, the perceived benefits of armed groups in wartime and the level of economic 
development.  
The post-conflict environment of a country and the decision calculus of rebel groups 
can be influenced by an intervention of a third party, such as the United Nations. Even though 
older research reveals that the influence of UN peacekeeping is limited, this changed after the 
end of the Cold War (Diehl, Reifschneider & Hensel, 1996: 684; Fortna, 2004: 288). As Fortna 
(2004) explains, peace is more likely to endure when the international community is involved, 
even though the presence of the international community in a conflict is no guarantee (Fortna, 
2004: 288). This is reinforced by Mason et al. (2011): evidence illustrates that peacekeeping 
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works since it results in a more stabilized peace (187). However, even though peacekeeping 
decreases the chances of conflict recurrence, it remains an enormous challenge for the 
international community. A glance at the history of the United Nations shows the difficulty of 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Success is limited and peacekeeping efforts are 
often subjected to numerous challenges before it can succeed (Bertram, 1995: 387; Weiss et 
al., 2014: 152). The institutional capacity of the UN varies in each case of peacekeeping. While 
in some cases conflict has recurred, in others it has not. To say a conflict has not recurred is 
not to say that the situation in the country is stable, peaceful and secure and that the government 
has well-functioning institutional mechanisms that do not commit human right abuses. In most 
cases, the exact opposite is true. Even though conflict has not recurred, the country experiences 
instability, insecurity and the civilians still live a difficult life. However, for the current 
analysis, conflict recurrence is a binary variable that looks at whether the civil war that ended 
in the years before has returned in full-scale 
Besides the influence of the characteristics of the previous war and the post-conflict 
environment on conflict recurrence, the availability of combatants affects conflict recurrence. 
As Walter (2004) contends, for a conflict to regain momentum, rebel groups need to have 
sufficient soldiers. Recruitment is, in turn, highly influenced by the environment in which the 
civilians or ex-combatants live. Among the most important reasons for enlistment are the 
dissatisfaction with the current individual situation of a civilian or an ex-combatant and the 
lack of changing this with nonviolent means (Walter, 2004: 371-74). The influence of the high 
availability of soldiers on conflict recurrence is reinforced by the literature on child soldiers 
(see Lasley & Thyne, 2015; Beber & Blattman, 2013; Haer & Böhmelt, 2016b; Humpheys & 
Weinstein, 2008; Maclure & Denov, 2006). The international community has been 
implementing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs to disarm 
combatants and to ensure a safe and peaceful transition from military to civilian life (Haer & 
Böhmelt, 2016a: 415). As a result, the post-conflict environment of the country is believed to 
be stabilized and sustained peace is expected to follow. The challenges identified in these DDR 
programs by the academic community are mainly of social, economic or psychological nature 
(see Annan, Brier & Aryemo, 2009; Blattman & Annan, 2010; Boothby, Crawford & Halperin, 
2006; Derluyn, Vindevogel & De Haene, 2013; Hill & Langholtz, 2003). However, none of 
the research so far has looked at the institutional side of the problem at hand. This chapter 
presents data on the institutional capacity of the UN in the DDR programs for adult and child 
soldiers. The data relates to the context and outcomes involved in policy theory-driven 
evaluation. First, the concept of DDR is shortly introduced and the UN’s role in these programs 
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is illustrated. This overview is followed by three case studies: Sierra Leone, the DRC and 
Burundi. The institutional capacity of the UN in each of these cases is determined. The case 
studies present a short illustration of the conflict and the peace process, followed by a 
description of the policy output (the UN’s role in the specific DDR program) and the policy 
outcome (the degree of institutional capacity of the UN).  
 
3.1 DDR and the UN’s role 
Since 1989, the United Nations has been engaged in multidimensional peacekeeping efforts to 
end conflicts. These operations go beyond traditional peacekeeping and represent a shift 
towards establishing order, democracy, rule of law and social and economic infrastructures 
through intervention (Weiss et al., 2014: 89). As a result, Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration programs became an integral part of peacekeeping operations (Munive & 
Jakobsen, 2012: 361). DDR is a component within the wider peacebuilding framework that 
tries to ensure post-conflict stability in war-torn societies. As Knight & Özerdem (2004) 
explain, the war-to-peace transition in a country is not possible without a successful DDR 
program (513). However, without a successful peacekeeping effort, the chances of a successful 
DDR program are low (Knight & Özerdem, 2004: 501). DDR and peacekeeping are 
inextricably linked to each other. A United Nations peacekeeping operation aims to provide 
stability and sustained peace, while avoiding conflict recurrence. DDR is one of the ways it 
tries to achieve this objective. DDR “aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that 
arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their 
former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development” 
(United Nations, 2006: 1.10, 1-2). However, the ultimate aim of DDR is to prevent conflict 
recurrence, or in other words, to make peace sustainable and ever-lasting (United Nations, 
2006: 2.10, 4). The process facilitates the transformation of combatants into civilians, 
supporting a country’s war-to-peace transition, and lessens the chances of conflict recurrence. 
 The goals of DDR are to be accomplished through a three-phase process. The soldiers 
are disarmed, which is followed by demobilization. Demobilization can be best described as 
the formal discharge of their military role. This phase is supplemented by reinsertion 
assistance, which is short-term financial and/or vocational support. Finally, because of 
reintegration efforts, former combatants are transitioned into civilian life. They receive, for 
instance, financial, health and educational assistance (United Nations, 2006: 1.10, 2). Even 
though DDR consists of these three stages, the phases are interrelated but should not be viewed 
as sequential. Instead, they should be viewed as a required process that a country needs to 
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experience to recover from conflict (Haer & Böhmelt, 2016a: 415). DDR is funded through a 
variety of financing mechanisms: the UN peacekeeping operation budget, (emergency) funds, 
voluntarily contributions, government grants, government loans and credits, and agency cost-
sharing. Often, a single DDR program utilizes multiple of these financial resources. It is 
important to emphasize that while disarmament and demobilization (including reinsertion) are 
funded by the UN budget when DDR is part of a UN mission, reintegration is always financed 
by voluntary contributions from member states and donors. The most common type of funding 
for DDR are the trust funds, primarily controlled by either the UN Development Program or 
the World Bank (United Nations, 2016).  
While DDR focuses on all ex-combatants, the issue of child combatants requires special 
attention. As Bakaki & Hinkkainen (2016) demonstrate, the successful reintegration of child 
soldiers into society is crucial in achieving successful peacekeeping operations. In the same 
research, they illustrate how the United Nations considers the issue of child soldiering when 
deciding to deploy a peacekeeping force. Child soldiers present a threat to post-conflict stability 
and security due to their tendency to rejoin armed groups. As a result, since 2000, whenever 
child soldiers are involved in a conflict, the United Nations is more responsive in deploying 
peacekeeping operations (Bakaki & Hinkkainen, 2016: 548-55). This perceived threat is 
reinforced by Haer & Böhmelt (2016a). They also demonstrate the low opportunity costs of 
child soldiers to rejoin a rebellion, but add an extra dimension to it: child soldiers are also more 
willing to re-engage in rebel groups. Both the opportunity costs and willingness of child 
soldiers are determined by educational and economic drawbacks and psychological harms 
experienced because of the previous conflict (Haer & Böhmelt, 2016a: 412-13). Child soldiers 
are a major threat to post-conflict stability and successfully reintegrating them into civilian life 
can prevent the recurrence of violence (Banholzer & Haer, 2014: 111, 124; Gislesen, 2006: 49; 
Hill & Langholtz, 2003: 284; Wessels, 2006: 154). Therefore, it is important that child 
combatants are subjected to a DDR program. The process is slightly different, even though it 
follows the same three-phase process as adult DDR. When child soldiers disarm, they do not 
hand in a weapon because children are not always used as combatants by armed groups. They 
also do not receive reinsertion assistance during demobilization. Whereas adult reintegration 
includes mainly cash assistance and vocational training, the reintegration of child soldiers 
focuses more on education, recreational activities, psychological assistance and skills training. 
An important aspect of the reintegration process is family tracing. Once the parents or family 
members are identified, the former child soldiers return home and continue their education or 
skills training. Because of possible stigmatization when child soldiers return home, child-
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centered DDR is more community-based and therefore provides not only assistance to the 
children but also to their communities (Haer, 2016: 3; Haer & Böhmelt, 2016a: 415-16; United 
Nations, 2006: 5.30, 1-27). Child-centered DDR enforces a more holistic approach than the 
general DDR process since it incorporates the long-term development goals and the 
community.  
 
3.2 The UN and DDR in Sierra Leone 
On 23 March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded Sierra Leone from 
neighboring country Liberia to overthrow the one-party regime of the All People’s Congress. 
Since its independence from the British colonizers in 1961, Sierra Leone was ruled by 
authoritarian, corrupt and violent political elites. This form of government sparked discontent 
and frustration among the young Sierra Leoneans, who united themselves through the RUF 
(Denov, 2010: 50-60; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2009: 51; Ukeje, 2003: 113-15). Eleven years 
of violence and alternating control of power by armed groups followed. Growing discontent 
and frustration lead to the formations of several armed groups, such as the National Provisional 
Ruling Council that consisted of defected soldiers of the Sierra Leonean army, which later 
transformed into the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), an alliance between the 
RUF and these defected soldiers. These newly formed armed groups tried to gain power 
through military coups. Control over the country was always short-lived; it was just a matter 
of time before another party took over control. The first attempt at peace was made in 1996 
with the signing of the Abidjan agreement and the deployment of the UN Observer Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNOSMIL) two years later. However, this attempt failed due to continued 
violence (Denov, 2010: 60-73; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2009: 51; Ukeje, 2003: 115-119). The 
pressure on President Kabbah to consolidate peace increased and despite his reluctance, he 
engaged in peace negotiations with the RUF and other rebel groups. As a result, on 7 July 1999, 
the Lomé Peace Accord was signed. This did not, however, signal the end of the Sierra Leonean 
civil war (Denov, 2010: 73-75; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2009: 51-52). In November 1999, 
the UN began deploying troops as agreed upon in the Lomé Peace Accord (1999). It was the 
largest peacekeeping force ever deployed to that point. It was, however, weak and poorly 
organized and was unable to stop the violence. A British intervention proved crucial as they 
weakened the RUF, the main perpetrator of the violence. It also showed strong commitment of 
the international community and gave the UN time to strengthen its weak and poorly organized 
peacekeeping force (Kreps, 2010: 105). Following the British intervention, the UN deployed a 
more effective peacekeeping force and the armed groups were demobilized as a result of the 
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Abuja Ceasefire Agreement (2000). Due to the decreasing strength of the RUF, multiple 
sovereignty disappeared. The warring parties were willing to end the violence. Eventually, 
President Kabbah declared peace in February 2002 (Denov, 2010: 76; Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2009: 51-52; Ukeje, 2003: 128-30).  
 
3.2.1 Policy output: the UN’s role in the DDR program 
The Sierra Leonean combatants have been subjected to a DDR program as a result of the peace 
negotiations. In July 1998, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (NCDDR) started to begin its work. This committee aimed to achieve a short-
term security situation that could provide the basis for sustained peace. The program was 
mainly funded by the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The goal of the DDR program 
was to collect and destroy all weapons and munitions, to demobilize 45,000 combatants, and 
to prepare and support the reintegration of ex-combatants. Disarmament and demobilization 
was implemented through a parallel disarmament process in which two Sierra Leonean districts 
were disarmed simultaneously in one month, after which both districts were declared 
“disarmed” and the process moved to two new districts. Demobilization then started in the 
disarmed districts (Thusi & Meek, 2003: 24-27). In addition, the NCDDR delegated 
responsible for the child soldiers to UNICEF, which worked together with many local and 
international NGOs. UNICEF aimed for the demobilization of 5,400 children (Brooks, 2005: 
x). The disarmament and demobilization program started in 1998 and lasted until January 2002. 
Reintegration efforts ended in 2004 (Thusi & Meek, 2003: 25-27).  
The NCDDR designed the DDR process with the idea that the international community 
supported the program. It was assumed that UNAMSIL would guarantee security, would 
deploy UN Military Observers, and would ensure compliance by all parties of the Lomé Peace 
Accord (1999) and the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement (2000) (Thusi & Meek, 2003: 25-27). This 
role envisioned by the NCDDR was supported by the UN approach towards Sierra Leone. 
Agreed upon in the Lomé Accord (1999), UNOMSIL was responsible for the disarmament of 
all armed groups and was present on all demobilization sites. The UN Security Council 
transformed UNOMSIL into UNAMSIL through SC Res. 1270 in October 1999. UNAMSIL’s 
mandate was to support the DDR process in Sierra Leone. It called for a maximum of 6,000 
military personnel. In February 2000, the UN Security Council passed a new resolution, SC 
Res. 1289, to increase military personnel to a maximum of 11,100 because of the lack of 
progress in Sierra Leone. Violence continued to persist. In SC Res. 1313 (2000), the mandate 
of UNAMSIL was extended: the peacekeeping force was now to assist in the political process 
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that would result in a renewed DDR program. The emphasis on DDR and extension of UN 
support only grew in the following Security Council resolutions. The UN was to support full 
implementation of and active participation in the DDR program. This meant, for instance, that 
the UN’s role also included managing the program in cooperation with the Government of 
Sierra Leone and that the maximum strength of military personnel was increased to 17,500. 
The Security Council also urged international organizations and donor countries to support 
DDR in Sierra Leone financially as there was a serious lack of funding at the time (SC Res. 
1346, 2001; SC Res. 1370, 2001). In March 2002, the peacekeeping operation reached its 
maximum deployment of troops as 17,368 military personnel was present in the country 
(UNAMSIL, 2009). In the same month, SC Res. 1400 (2002) announced the completion of the 
disarmament phase, but reiterated the lack of funding for the DDR program. In the following 
years, the policy of the UN regarding DDR in Sierra Leone was not revised through the passing 
of resolutions. In December 2005, the mandate of UNAMSIL ended and the United Nations 
Integrated Office in Sierra Leone was established to assist the government of Sierra Leone in 
reconstructing the country. DDR was not mentioned in this resolution (SC Res. 1620, 2005). 
The UN’s role in the DDR process was declared a success in 2005 (Kreps, 2010: 105). The 
policy of the UN towards DDR in Sierra Leone contained military support, support for the 
disarmament phase, and active participation in the implementation of the program. UNAMSIL 
could be viewed as the main partner of the Government of Sierra Leone in implementing and 
coordinating the DDR program. 
Besides the general DDR program, the UN was highly involved with the DDR program 
for child soldiers. Already in 1999, the UN Security Council passed SC Res. 1270 (1999), 
emphasizing the issue of children in the armed conflict. Since this resolution, the UN continued 
to voice its support for the protection of children’s rights (SC Res. 1400, 2002; SC Res. 1620, 
2005). Important to note is that UNAMSIL was the first peacekeeping operations to employ 
and fund a Child Protection Advisor (CPA). The Child Protection Office worked closely with 
UNICEF and the Government of Sierra Leone to manage international and local child 
protection NGOs, identifying, advocating, and advising on child protection issues (Shepler, 
2014: 62; Truth and Reconciliation Committee, 2004: 331-332). UNICEF was the primary 
actor in the child-centered DDR program. The NCDDR delegated full responsibility to this UN 
agency. It coordinated all NGOs that implemented the child-centered DDR components and 
distributed the financial resources of the World Bank (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers, 2006: 13; Shepler, 2014: 64; Truth and Reconciliation Committee, 2004: 332-33). In 
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terms of the child-centered DDR program, the UN was the main actor responsible for the 
implementing of the process.  
 
3.2.2 Policy outcome: the degree of institutional capacity of the UN  
The Sierra Leonean DDR program is a successful example of how DDR can support a country’s 
transition from war to peace. Since 2002, the country has been relatively stable and conflict 
has not recurred. Democratic elections took place and the RUF has transformed into a political 
party (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2009: 47). The country remains fragile and in need of 
international assistance, but progress remains and it is slowly recovering from a state of failure 
during the civil war (Associated Press, 2011). In 2014, the UN Security Council reported on 
the situation in Sierra Leone. The Council recognized the need for further improvements in the 
economic and political realm, but emphasized the “considerable progress that has been made 
by Sierra Leone in strengthening institutional and human resources capacities of State 
institutions, including in the security, justice and governance sectors which play crucial roles 
in safeguarding stability and promoting democracy” (United Nations Security Council, 2014b). 
Even though the country still has its challenges, Sierra Leone is relatively stable and peaceful. 
Conflict has not recurred, thereby pointing to a high institutional capacity of the United 
Nations.  
 The absence of conflict recurrence is substantiated by the success of the DDR process, 
thereby reaffirming the high institutional capacity of the United Nations. While the NCDDR 
aimed to demobilize 45,000 combatants, a total of 72,490 combatants eventually participated 
in the program. 33.6% of these combatants were RUF soldiers, 11.6% were associated with the 
AFRC, while the rest identified itself with the remaining armed factions participating in the 
conflict (Peters, 2007: 40). Participation was thus high and widespread among the various 
armed groups. However, regarding disarmament, the numbers illustrate a less successful story. 
UNAMSIL estimated that the program was only able to collect 2 to 10 percent of the weapons 
in circulation, even though 42,300 weapons were collected. Also, reintegration faced it 
challenges. In October 2002, 56,751 demobilized ex-combatants were registered for 
reintegration assistance, that is approximately 75 percent of the total demobilized combatants. 
However, only 25 percent had completed their training, and approximately 30 percent was still 
participating in their training. That means that almost 50 percent of the ex-combatants that 
registered for reintegration was still waiting for assistance in October 2002 (Ginifer, 2003: 39; 
International Crisis Group, 2004: 11; Kaldor & Vincent, 2006: 17; Malan, 2003: 13-15; Thusi 
& Meek, 2003: 25-27). In addition to the statistics, the process itself proved to be successful 
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as well, even though challenges can be identified, mainly due to the lack of funding. UNAMSIL 
and UNICEF cooperated with the NCDDR. UNAMSIL was able to provide expertise, 
resources, and the needed support in management and oversight. The DD components of the 
program were marked completed when the war ended in 2002 (Thusi & Meek, 2003: 24, 33-
36). Reintegration, on the other hand, was complex. Despite external aid, funding remained 
insufficient. It was subjected to one of the main pitfalls of DDR: the financial contributions of 
the international community were mainly used for disarmament and demobilization, leaving 
reintegration with a lack of funds. Therefore, many of the programs established were focused 
on the short-term, instead of the long-term (Ginifer, 2003: 39-42; International Crisis Group, 
2004: 11). Even though disarmament and reintegration efforts proved to be more difficult, the 
UN still experienced a relatively high institutional capacity since conflict has not recurred, it 
was able to cooperate well with the NCDDR and the demobilization process, one of the primary 
responsibility of UNAMSIL, was extremely successful.  
 In addition to the general DDR process, the child-centered program was also relatively 
successful. UNICEF aimed for the demobilization of 5,400 children, but the DDR program 
succeeded in processing 6,845 children (Brooks, 2005: x). In terms of statistics, UNICEF thus 
achieved its objective. However, challenges always prevail and this was not different for child-
centered DDR. It suffered from the same funding problems as the general DDR program (Sesay 
& Ismail, 2003: 157-58). In addition, the reality did not always correspond to the expectations. 
One of the main problems was that even though the program stated that children were not 
required to present a weapon, this was not the case in practice. This excluded the children who 
had been part of an armed group but did not engage in combat, such as the cooks, the sexual 
slaves, etc. (Wessels, 2006: 166-167). Also, interviews with former child soldiers by Denov 
(2010) demonstrated that the process was subjected to corruption and mismanagement. For 
instance, there were delays, former child soldiers did not always receive their allowances, and 
there was not enough material available for their skills training (160). This is reinforced by an 
earlier Human Rights Watch (2005) report: commanders often committed fraud, embezzlement 
and misuse of the benefits provided to combatants. This was exacerbated by the fact that the 
NCDDR seemed to be cooperating in these practices. There was no independent grievance 
procedure where the combatants could voice their complaints (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 
56-64). Besides a lack of funding and corruption, the reintegration assistance provided did not 
always meet the expectations of the former child combatants because the implementing 
agencies were inadequately trained or lacked resources (International Crisis Group, 2003: 16). 
The assistance provided contributed only to the short-term, because most former child 
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combatants could not use the training acquired due to the lack of opportunities in the economy. 
The DDR program for children was marked completed in 2003 (Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers, 2006: 13; Denov, 2010: 161). Even though the program has been exposed to 
problems, the statistics in combination with the absence of conflict demonstrate the success of 
the child-centered DDR program, and thus the high institutional capacity of the UN.  
 The UN’s role in the DDR program proved to be valuable in Sierra Leone as it partnered 
with the Government of Sierra Leone. It started as a weak intervention, but after the British 
invasion and much needed time to recover, UNAMSIL became a strong peacekeeping 
operation. It was able to provide military assistance and expertise to the NCDDR. Especially 
in the field of child combatants, the UN had sole responsibility through UNICEF’s role of 
coordinating the program and managing the NGOs and financial resources. The results show 
that the UN was quite successful in Sierra Leone. Conflict has not recurred and the overall 
objectives of the DDR program were accomplished. Therefore, the UN utilized the rules, 
procedures and structures available to the organization to achieve the expected results. In other 
words, a high degree of institutional capacity can be attributed to the role of the UN in Sierra 
Leone.  
 
3.3 The UN and DDR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
After the Rwandan genocide, many Hutus fled to neighboring countries, such as the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. This destabilized the country and led to (increased) ethnic 
tensions, especially in the provinces of North and South Kivu in the eastern part of the DRC. 
United under the command of Laurent-Désiré Kabila and with support of Rwanda, the Tutsi 
armed group Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) challenged 
the rule of then President Mobutu in 1996. This initiated the First Congo War (1996-1997), in 
which the AFDL succeeded in overthrowing the government of Mobutu and Kabila became 
the president of the DRC. In 1999, the first peace agreement was signed, the Lusaka 
Agreement, by the rebel groups and African countries involved in the conflict, such as Angola, 
Namibia, Rwanda, and the DRC (Clark, 2011: 364-367; Eriksen, 2009: 652; Tull, 2009: 216; 
Vorrath, 2014: 153). However, violence persisted and the civil war gained an even more 
regional character. President Kabila did not sufficiently comply with the wishes and needs of 
the Rwandan government and his other foreign supporters such as Uganda. In August 1998, 
Kabila requested all foreign troops to leave the country. This triggered the Second Congo War 
in 1998 in which the Rwandan Army, in cooperation with the Ugandan government, tried to 
remove President Kabila from power. This attracted a regional response as Burundi, Angola, 
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Namibia and Zimbabwe became involved in the conflict, either in support of President Kabila 
or the Rwandan Army. This severely weakened the power of President Kabila and led to the 
creation of many rebel groups. All the armed groups fought against the government of 
President Kabila and against each other. In the beginning of 2001, the assassination of President 
Kabila led to the transfer of power to his son, Joseph Kabila. In contrast to his father, he was 
more open to negotiations with the rebel groups and international organizations (Eriksen, 2009: 
655-656; Tull, 2009: 216; Scherrer, 2012: 144; Vorrath, 2014: 154). This resulted in the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue and the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement in 2002. The 
agreement was signed by the Government and several armed groups, such as the RCD-Goma 
and the MLC. However, not all armed factions participated in the peace negotiations, which 
has contributed to the failure of ending the conflict successfully (Kreps, 2010: 100-101) Even 
though not all armed parties were included, the conflict was officially declared over in 2003, 
following the establishment of a transitional government. President Kabila remained president, 
but the RCD-Goma and MLC also received a seat in the government (Eriksen, 2009: 656; Tull, 
2009: 216; Scherrer, 2012: 144). Important to emphasize is that a strong Western intervention 
has not occurred throughout the conflict. Besides an EU intervention in 2003, Western 
countries have not committed themselves militarily to the peace process in the DRC despite 
the magnitude and regional character of the conflict (Eriksen, 2009: 656-657; Kreps, 2010: 99-
100).  
 
3.3.1 Policy output: the UN’s role in the DDR program 
In the Lusaka Agreement (1999) and the subsequent Sun City Final Act (2003), it was agreed 
upon that the DRC would be subjected to a DDR program for adult and child combatants. The 
National Commission for Demobilization and Reinsertion (CONADER), which was replaced 
in 2008 by the Execution Unit of the National DDR Program, was responsible for the national 
program. In contrast to Sierra Leone, the World Bank was the primary international actor 
involved in the DRC. The national DDR program was part of the Multi-Donor Reintegration 
Program (MDRP) for the Great Lakes Region, designed and funded by the World Bank 
(Perrazzone, 2016: 2; Scherrer, 2012: 146-147). The MDRP was established because it was 
believed that no single actor could solve the issues related to the DRC conflict and its region. 
The program aimed to achieve successful DDR programs to “[establish] peace and [restore] 
security, which are in turn pre-conditions for sustainable growth and poverty reduction” (World 
Bank, 2002: 1). The MDRP designed and funded five national programs (Kölln, 2011: 7). The 
DDR program in the DRC was one of those five national programs. Disarmed combatants were 
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offered two options: they could either be integrated into the Armed Forces of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (FARDC) or demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life. The 
national DDR program aimed to demobilize 150,000 combatants from all armed groups 
participating in the conflict. The program started in 2004 and remained in place until 2011 
(Perrazzone, 2016: 2, 7-9; Scherrer, 2012: 146-147; World Bank, 2004b; World Bank, 2010: 
24). Under the leadership of the African Development Bank, the Transitional Demobilization 
Reintegration Program continued the process of DDR in the DRC in 2011 (Perrazzone, 2016: 
7-8). The focus in this research is on the MDRP phase since this program is completed. This 
makes it easier to evaluate the program and the progress that has been made. It also provides 
for a better comparison with Sierra Leone and Burundi as three completed DDR programs are 
analyzed. In the subsequent sections and chapters, DDR in the DRC refers to the DDR program 
during the MDRP phase. 
Besides the general DDR program, there was a program implemented specifically for 
former child combatants. The Sun City Final Act (2003) emphasized the importance of DDR 
for children. It was estimated that approximately 39,000 children would have to go through 
DDR procedures (World Bank, 2004b). This estimate was constantly subjected to change, 
because of the high chances of re-recruitment as the conflict persisted (Pauletto & Patel, 2010: 
36-37). The DDR program for children started in mid-2005 and ended in mid-2007 (Coalition 
to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2007: 3). CONADER was primarily responsible for the 
removal of all children from armed groups and the transformation from combatants into 
civilians. Children could not choose to reintegrate into the FARDC. Instead, they were always 
demobilized after disarmament and transferred to a Transit and Orientation Center for social 
activities, schooling and psychological assistance. The centers were often run by Congolese 
NGOs with the support of international NGOs or UNICEF. After demobilization, the child 
soldiers were reintegrated into civilian life (Amnesty International, 2006: 18-20; Pauletto & 
Patel, 2010: 43; Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, 2006: 46-47). In addition to the 
national program, the MDRP also included Special Projects. One of the projects was concerned 
with child soldiers. Because of their technical expertise, the World Bank asked international 
NGOs to demobilize children and provide community-based reintegration support. In total, six 
projects were established by international NGOs in the DRC as part of MDRP’s Special 
Projects (Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, 2006: 46). One of these programs was 
led by UNICEF. It aimed to support the national child-centered DDR program and assist the 
prevention of child soldier recruitment. The program was completed in April 2007 (World 
Bank, 2010: 71).  
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Even though the UN was not the lead international agency to support the DDR program, 
it was involved in the process. The UN approach towards the DRC was highly influenced by 
previous events. Considering the UN failure in Rwanda, the conflict in the DRC presented a 
critical opportunity for the UN to demonstrate how it can be of significance in international 
peacekeeping, especially considering the connection of the conflict to the Rwandan genocide. 
The UN started to deploy troops in November 1999 under the leadership of MONUC following 
the Lusaka Agreement (Clark, 2011: 364). The mandate of MONUC included the monitoring 
of the ceasefire agreement, the protection of human rights (including children’s rights), to 
observe the disarmament and demobilization of the armed groups, and to support the 
coordination and implementation of the DDR process “on a voluntary basis” (SC Res. 1279, 
1999; SC Res. 1291, 2000; SC Res. 1355, 2001). MONUC was authorized to deploy 
approximately 5,5000 military personnel and acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
which meant that MONUC was authorized to use force when necessary (SC Res. 1291, 2000). 
When in 2004 the DDR program started, the military role of MONUC expanded. The signing 
of the Global and Inclusive Agreement (2002) and the Sun City Final Act (2003) signaled the 
inclusion of MONUC in the DDR program. SC Res. 1493 (2003) expressed the support for the 
transitional government and authorized the participation of MONUC in the DDR process that 
was established in the DRC as part of the MDRP framework. MONUC focused on 
disarmament and demobilization. SC Res. 1565 (2004) reinforced this role of MONUC and 
reiterated that the mission was acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The role of 
MONUC in the DDR process mainly included the monitoring of the program, the facilitation 
of disarmament and demobilization and the provision of security. It also emphasized the 
importance of human rights protection, especially the rights of children (SC Res. 1565, 2004). 
The following years, the changes to the mandate were limited. It only increasingly emphasized 
the need to disarm and demobilize child soldiers and to continue to support the overall process 
of DDR. This meant cooperating with the FARDC, the newly formed national army, against 
the FLDR (SC Res. 1756, 2007) Besides the fact that the UN was engaging with one of the 
warring parties in the conflict and thereby endangering its neutrality, the FARDC attacked 
civilians and violated human rights (Clark, 2011: 373-375). MONUC was authorized to use a 
maximum of 19,815 military personnel (SC Res. 1856, 2008). The mission eventually deployed 
18,653 military troops, reaching almost full strength (MONUC, 2010).  
In 2010, the Congolese government requested the withdrawal of MONUC. As a 
response, the mission was transformed into the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (Vorrath, 2014: 161-162). 
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This did not change the authorization of the number of military personnel. However, 
MONUSCO’s mandate did not include support for the DDR process (SC Res. 1925, 2010). 
The protection of human rights, in particular the rights of children in armed conflict, remained 
an important aspect of the resolutions about MONUSCO (SC Res. 2021, 2011). The work of 
MONUC was severely hampered by the absence of political will to accomplish long-term goals 
by the Congolese and international actors. The national armed groups were unwilling to 
cooperate in ending the conflict; they claimed that MONUC had sole responsibility for ending 
the conflict. There was significant absence of political will (Eriksen, 2009: 659; Koko, 2011: 
32-36; Neethling, 2011: 23-24; Tull, 2009: 219-223). The policy of the UN towards DDR in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo thus contained the provision of security, the protection 
of human rights and the monitoring and observation of the DDR program. It supported the 
overall process, but there are no signs of active participation in the DDR program, except for 
the facilitation of the disarmament and demobilization phase. The UN’s role in the DRC also 
had a more militaristic nature because MONUC acted under Chapter VII of the Charter.  
As early as SC Res. 1355 (2001), MONUC was concerned with the use of child soldiers 
in the DRC conflict and remained involved with the issue (SC Res. 1756, 2007). MONUC 
included CPAs who assisted UNICEF and international NGOs (Child Soldiers, 2008). 
UNICEF was the main partner of CONADER in the child-centered DDR program, but this 
partnership suffered from the mismanagement of CONADER and its refusal to change (DAI, 
2007: 21-25). In addition, UNICEF cooperated with NGOs to demobilize child soldiers and to 
reunite them with their families (Amnesty International, 2006: 17-19). UNICEF was also 
involved in the Special Projects under the MDRP framework, but the organization was on the 
same level as the other NGOs that implemented a project focused on child-centered DDR 
(World Bank, 2010: 69-73). While the UN tried to support child-centered DDR as best as it 
possibly could, it proved to be very difficult and UNICEF was never able to sufficiently assist 
CONADER in implementing child-centered DDR.    
 
3.3.2 Policy outcome: the degree of institutional capacity of the UN  
In 2006, the first democratic elections were held which ended the power of the transitional 
government. Joseph Kabila was elected as president. Despite the presence of the transitional 
government and the elections, violence persisted from the moment the conflict ended in 2003. 
Rwanda and Uganda remained active participants in the conflict (Eriksen, 2009: 656-57; Tull, 
2009: 217). In addition, none of the armed groups were genuinely committed to the peace 
process. They were more concerned with maintaining their power (Oder, 2011: 52). The 
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situation has not changed significantly. New armed groups continued to form, such as the 
“March 23” rebel movement in 2012 (Vorrath, 2014: 161-62). The civilian population still 
experiences the disastrous effects of civil war: the economy is destroyed, government 
institutions are ineffective and innocent civilians are killed every day. The conflict in the DRC 
remains one of the deadliest conflicts in the world, especially in the eastern part of the country 
(Scherrer, 2012: 144-45). This is reinforced by several recent UN reports. For instance, on 3 
October 2016, the UN reported that the DRC still experiences insecurity and violence. Child 
soldiers continued to be recruited by armed groups (United Nations Security Council, 2016: 6, 
13). The UN report on Children and Armed Conflict (United Nations Security Council, 2014a) 
supports this observation. The main parties participating in the violence are the Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which mainly consists of displaced Hutus as a 
result of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the FARDC (Neethling, 2011: 23-26). In 
conclusion, the UN failed to avoid conflict recurrence, arguably because the conflict never 
ended, pointing to a low institutional capacity in the DRC.  
 In line with the conflict recurrence, the DDR process has not been successful, thereby 
reinforcing the degree of institutional capacity of the United Nations. In terms of statistics, the 
DDR program successfully disarmed and demobilized approximately 100,000 combatants. 
This means that 68 percent of the targeted combatants (150,000) were disarmed and 
demobilized. These demobilized combatants received reinsertion assistance according to the 
MDRP Final Report (World Bank, 2010: 24). The targeted combatants for reinsertion was only 
120,000, resulting in an 85 percent achievement rate. However, only 58 percent of the ex-
combatants received reintegration support (World Bank, 2010: 24; World Bank, 2012: iii). 
There are no statistics available that differentiate the results between the armed groups, even 
though the program aimed to disarm and demobilized combatants from all armed groups 
involved in the conflict. The numbers demonstrate that the success of the disarmament and 
demobilization process was limited and that reintegration proved to be difficult. The limited 
success illustrated by the statistics is reinforced by policy reports on the process. In general, 
the program had to deal with the limited infrastructure that could be used to organize 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts and there were many combatants that 
needed to go through the DDR process. The DDR program was subjected to corruption which 
influenced its results, especially in the reintegration phase. Within CONADER, certain officials 
within the national committee were associated with political parties and armed groups. 
Therefore, they were not always in favor of DDR as this could weaken their military strength 
and thus their power (Kölln, 2011: 13; Perrazzone, 2016: 10-15). Congolese armed groups also 
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refused to disarm and, instead embezzled the funds for different activities (Koko, 2011: 36). 
Due to a lack of political will from the armed groups to demobilize and mismanagement of 
funds, especially in the reintegration phase, the DDR program failed to create a politically 
stable and secure country, to increase economic development and to reintegrate demobilized 
soldiers. The MDRP phase of the DDR process in the DRC was relatively unsuccessful, both 
in terms of the statistics and the achievement of the program objectives. These challenges 
severely weakened the institutional capacity of the UN to achieve peace and security.  
 In addition to the problems faced in the general DDR program, the institutional capacity 
of the UN is lowered by the complications during the child-centered DDR process. The 
program in the DRC reached over 30,000 children in the disarmament and demobilization 
phase. That is 80 percent of the targeted 39,000 child soldiers to be disarmed and demobilized 
(World Bank, 2012: iii). However, reintegration proved difficult. By December 2006, just half 
a year before the child-centered DDR program ended, almost 50 percent was still waiting for 
reintegration assistance. The difficulties in the process are attributed to the mismanagement by 
CONADER, which forced NGOs to adopt ad hoc responses. While the DDR program officially 
started in mid-2005, reintegration programs only commenced in the beginning of 2006 
(Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2007: 11). The problems with CONADER were 
thoroughly displayed in the evaluation in 2007 produced by DAI, a development consultancy 
agency contracted by the World Bank. UNICEF was supposed to train CONADER to assume 
responsibility. This proved difficult due to the weak management and lack of will of 
CONADER (DAI, 2007: 12, 25). The agency failed to adequately supervise and monitor the 
child-centered DDR program. It refused to accept training on these matters by UNICEF (DAI, 
2007: 4-5). Besides the mismanagement by CONADER, the process suffered from lack of 
funds and absence of political will. By mid-2007, CONADER ended its national DDR 
program, which also meant the end of child-centered DDR in DRC (Child Soldiers, 2008; 
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, 2006: 6). Besides the national program, the Special 
Projects initiated by the World Bank in cooperation with international NGOs were generally 
regarded as “moderately satisfactory” (World Bank, 2010: 69-73). UNICEF’s project was rated 
satisfactory as it was able to assist the DDR process of 4,000 children and supported the release 
of 30,000 child soldiers from armed groups. In addition, UNICEF contributed its knowledge 
to increase the harmonization and coordination of the national child-centered DDR program 
(World Bank, 2010: 71). To sum up, the child-centered DDR process was obstructed by the 
issues with CONADER, since it proved to be an incapable actor and severely hindered the 
The Institutional Capacity of the United Nations 
 
	
37 
national process. This weakened the institutional capacity of the UN, even though UNICEF’s 
own Special Project was relatively successful. 
While elections were held and humanitarian assistance has been provided to civilians, 
the result of the UN are mixed. The environment in the DRC proved very difficult. The conflict 
was complex and the parties involved were unwilling to commit themselves fully to the peace 
process. In addition, it should be taken into account that the UN was not the primary supporter 
of the DDR program. Instead, the World Bank took the responsibility to lead, developed the 
MDRP regional framework and supported the national DDR program in the DRC. However, 
the UN mission in the DRC included high military support, but it was unable to translate these 
resources in substantive participation in the DDR program. Conflict has recurred and the UN 
was not able to implement its rules, structures and procedures to achieve the expected results. 
Therefore, the institutional capacity of the UN in the DRC was low. 
 
3.4 The UN and DDR in Burundi 
The conflict in Burundi has been a conflict over ethnic tensions and control of government. 
Since colonial times, the powerful Tutsi minority and the disadvantaged Hutu majority needed 
to find ways to live together (Banal & Scherrer, 2008: 30; Curtis, 2012: 79; Edmonds, Mills & 
McNamee, 2009: 38). Burundi gained independence in 1962 and government overthrows and 
violence emerged (Boshoff, 2010: 3). The most recent conflict ignited because of the 
assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye on 21 
October 1993 in a coup committed by Tutsi extremists. The violence escalated because of the 
death of his successor, President Cyprien Ntaryamira, on 6 April 1994 in an airplane crash. In 
addition, the civil war gained further momentum due to the genocide in neighboring Rwanda 
(Banal & Scherrer, 2008: 30; Boshoff, 2010: 6). Multiple coups followed by Tutsi factions and 
the country was ravaged by violence between the Hutus and Tutsis. No end was in sight and 
armed groups continued to be formed (Boshoff, 2010: 6-8). Eventually, in August 2002, the 
Burundian government negotiated a peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, with eighteen 
parties. As a result, a transitional government was established in November 2003. However, 
two of the main Hutu rebel groups, CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL, did not participate 
in the negotiations and signing of the peace agreements, resulting in continuing violence. Even 
though the Arusha Accords (2000) were unable to immediately stop the violence, it provided 
the basis for the future peace process. It stipulated that the government and the military would 
include an equal power-sharing arrangement between the Hutu and Tutsi groups to guarantee 
an ethnic balance. In October 2003, the transitional government agreed with the CNDD-FDD, 
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the most important Hutu rebel group, upon the Global Ceasefire Agreement (2003). This 
agreement included the CNDD-FDD in the Arusha Accords (2000), resulting in strong political 
commitment to start the transition from war to peace in Burundi. This led to a new constitution 
and parliamentary elections in February 2005 (Banal & Scherrer, 2008: 30-31; Boshoff, 2010: 
6-8; Curtis, 2012: 83-86; Edmonds, Mills & McNamee, 2009: 39, 46-47; World Bank, 2004a: 
4-5). The Palipehutu-FNL, the oldest Hutu rebel group, remained outside the agreements until 
2006. In September of that year, the armed group signed a ceasefire agreement with the 
Burundian government in Dar-es-Salaam. The Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement (2006) 
was supposed to end all hostilities between the warring parties. However, due to lack of 
commitment on both sides and continuing violence, the implementation of the agreement only 
started in 2008 (Edmonds, Mills & McNamee, 2009: 46; Rumin, 2012: 71-73). Important to 
emphasize is that Burundi was not subjected to a strong Western intervention such as the British 
interference in Sierra Leone. However, there was substantial regional support since the 
predecessor of the African Union, the Organization of African Unity, was the main third party 
involved in the peace negotiations leading to the Arusha Accords (2000) (Knight, 2010: 43). 
The African Union deployed the African Mission in Burundi in 2003, before it was replaced 
by UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004 (Boshoff & Vrey, 2010: 52).  
 
3.4.1 Policy output: the UN’s role in the DDR program 
In the Arusha Accords (2000), it was decided that Burundi would be subjected to a 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program. However, it only became a realistic 
plan after the Global Ceasefire Agreement (2003) (Boshoff, ONUB Electoral Section & Vrey, 
2010: 90). The National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration 
(CNDRR) was established in August 2003 to oversee the entire program. Similar to the DRC, 
the DDR program in Burundi was part of the MDRP framework, guided and financed by World 
Bank (Banal & Scherrer, 2008: 43). In addition to the World Bank, the African Mission in 
Burundi and later ONUB, UNICEF and NGOs also supported the CNDRR (Boshoff & Vrey, 
2010: 52-54). The overall goal of the DDR program was “to help consolidate peace in Burundi 
and the Great Lakes region” (World Bank, 2004a: 16). The program aimed to demobilize 
55,000 combatants from the Burundi Armed Forces (FAB) and the armed political parties and 
movements. In addition, it intended to demobilize 20,000 Gardiens de la Paix, a government-
led militia group, and 10,000 militia combatants. Lastly, DDR was to focus on transferring the 
governmental defense budget to social and economic sectors (World Bank, 2004a: 8, 16). The 
DDR program was officially initiated in December 2004 and ended in 2008 (Douma & Gasana, 
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2008: 12). In contrast to Sierra Leone and the DRC, the program skipped the disarmament 
phase and started with the demobilization phase as this was believed to be more appropriate 
(Rumin, 2012: 76). Demobilization was overseen by the CNDRR and first occurred on a 
voluntary basis, but this changed in 2005 when a presidential decree ordered all combatants to 
demobilization sites (Boshoff, 2006: 144; Boshoff, ONUB Electoral Section & Vrey, 2010: 
81;). After demobilization, combatants had two options: they could reintegrate into the newly 
formed Burundian army, the National Defense Force (NDF) or the police force, or they could 
transition into civilian life. Reintegration efforts focused on the individual, instead of the 
community, and consisted of a reinsertion and reintegration assistance upon leaving the 
demobilization site. (Douma & Gasana, 2008: 6; Fulhrott, 2007: 326-327; Edmonds, Mills & 
McNamee, 2009: 46-48). While this DDR phase ended in 2008, a second phase started in 2009 
as a response to the renewed commitment of the Burundian government and the Palipehutu-
FNL to the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement (2006). This phase focuses on the 
demobilization and reintegration of FNL ex-combatants, but also on the so-called Adultes 
Associés, civilians associated with the FNL but who did not engage in direct combat (Willems 
& Van Leeuwen, 2014: 323). The analysis focuses on the first phase under the MDRP 
framework to facilitate comparison to Sierra Leone and the DRC.  
The DDR process included a specific section on child soldiers. Demobilization and 
reintegration efforts of former child combatants were the responsibility of the National 
Structure of Child Soldiers (SNES) which was supported and financed by UNICEF and MDRP 
(Boshoff & Vrey, 2010: 64). It was executed under the umbrella of MDRP’s Special Projects, 
similar to the DRC. However, while several NGOs were responsible for child soldiers’ 
demobilization and reintegration in the DRC, UNICEF was the only partner in Burundi. The 
Project aimed to demobilize a total of 3,000 child combatants in the FAB, the Gardiens de la 
Paix and the armed political parties and movements (World Bank, 2010: 69). It also focused 
on implementing mechanisms that would prevent future recruitment by the warring parties. In 
contrast to adult combatants, child combatants could not integrate in to the NDF. Instead, 
families were traced and local partners were appointed for demobilization and reintegration in 
specific provinces. The program started in August 2004, a couple of months before adult DDR 
began, and lasted until June 2006 (Boshoff, ONUB Electoral Section & Vrey, 2010: 79; Multi-
Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2007: 1; World Bank, 2004a: 66).  
Similar to the DRC, the UN was not the main international actor in Burundi. As the 
national DDR program was part of the MDRP, the World Bank took the lead but the UN was 
a partner organization of CNDRR. In May 2004, the UN became involved as it replaced the 
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African mission with ONUB. It assisted demobilization efforts and facilitated and coordinated 
its military troops in support of the reintegration process (Banal & Scherrer, 2008: 43-44). SC 
Res. 1545 (2004) expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in Burundi, especially 
for the children involved in the conflict. It established ONUB and it was authorized to act under 
Chapter VII, which meant that it could use all force necessary to complete its mandate. ONUB 
was expected to implement and support the disarmament and demobilization phase of the DDR 
program in Burundi, to provide security in the pre-disarmament assembly site and to monitor 
the FAB and its reform (SC Res. 1545, 2004). The disarmament process took place outside of 
the DDR program (Boshoff, 2010: 59; Rumin, 2012: 84). In addition, ONUB was expected to 
advise and assist the transitional government on matters related to, for instance, child protection 
(SC Res. 1545, 2004). Subsequent resolutions did not expand ONUB’s mandate; it only 
reinforced the importance of the subject at hand. For instance, SC Res. 1650 (2005) urged the 
transitional government to complete the DDR program. ONUB was authorized to deploy 5,650 
military personnel. On 30 September 2005, ONUB was at full strength with the deployment of 
5,665 military personnel (ONUB, 2007). In October 2006, ONUB was replaced by the UN 
Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) (Rumin, 2012: 84). BINUB’s mandate did not differ 
significantly from ONUB’s mandate. While active participation in disarmament and 
demobilization was not explicitly mentioned in the resolution, it continued to support the DDR 
program, including the support for the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement (2006). BINUB’s 
mandate explicitly mentioned Burundi’s plan for reform of the NDF and the police as part of 
the DDR program. It supported this development through the provision of technical assistance 
to both the NDF and the police (SC Res. 1719, 2006). In 2008, the UN emphasized the 
importance of the DDR program and the role of the international community in this process to 
fund and assist the three phases, while the Burundian government prepared the completion of 
the program (SC Res. 1858, 2008). BINUB remained active until 2014, although it was 
renamed the UN Office in Burundi in 2010 (BNUB, 2014). UN support included mostly 
assistance in the demobilization process and the provision of security, military support and 
advise on matters such as the army reform and the issue of child soldiers.  
 Regarding the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, the UN played a 
significant role throughout the whole process. Already in ONUB’s earlier resolutions, child 
protection was emphasized (SC Res. 1545, 2004). This continued until SC Res. 1791 (2007), 
in which the UN urged the FNL to release all child soldiers and to subject to the DDR program. 
In contrast to the DRC where multiple NGOs were given the responsibility to implement 
MDRP’s Special Project on Child Soldiers, UNICEF was given sole responsibility in Burundi. 
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The UN agency received the MDRP financing, which it could distribute among implementing 
partners, such as local NGOs. In addition, it cooperated with the SNES. UNICEF provided 
technical expertise and monitored all activities of the local NGOs (Boshoff, 2010: 64; 
Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2005: 4-5, 17). The SNES and 
UNICEF had a contradicting relationship. On the one hand, the SNES was officially 
responsible for the implementation of the child-centered DDR program. On the other hand, 
UNICEF controlled the funds and had the upper hand when it came to expertise. In practice, 
SNES had the same financial status as the local NGOs and did not exercise any control 
(Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2005: 18-19). The UN support in 
child-centered DDR was significant due to the responsibility of UNICEF. It actively 
participated in the implementation by coordinating the NGOs and the funds.  
 
3.4.2 Policy outcome: the degree of institutional capacity of the UN 
After DDR for adult and child combatants ended in 2008 and 2006 respectively, Burundi 
experienced multiple democratic elections and at first glance, the country succeeded in 
transitioning from war to peace through the implementation of power-sharing governance 
(Curtis, 2012: 74). The country has been relatively peaceful after the start of the demobilization 
of the FNL combatants in 2009, but the situation remains fragile. FNL rebels are a source of 
opposition and violence. In 2015, a military coup was attempted to overthrow the ruling 
President Nkurunziza. Since then, the country has experienced unrest and instability. On 20 
August 2015, President Nkurunziza was sworn in for this third term (UCDP, n.d.; United 
Nations Security Council, 2015: 2-4). There are fears that this latest crisis in politics could 
revive the internal conflict that officially ended with the signing of the Arusha Accords (2000) 
(Chonghaile, 2016). However, full-scale civil war has not recurred yet and judging by that 
criterion, the institutional capacity of the UN during the DDR program can be viewed as 
relatively high.  
 This degree of UN institutional capacity is substantiated by the results of the DDR 
program. When the program ended in 2008, 26,283 adult combatants were demobilized. 88 
percent of those demobilized ex-combatants received reinsertion assistance, while 80 percent 
received reintegration support (World Bank, 2010: 24). In addition, 18,709 Gardiens de la Paix 
and 9,764 militia combatants were processed (Multi-Country Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program, 2008). In other words, the DDR program demobilized nearly 50 
percent of the expected combatants from the FAB and the armed political parties and 
movements. In contrast, it demobilized more Gardiens de la Paix than expected, while the 
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number of demobilized militia combatants is almost the same as the expected number. At the 
end of 2005, most of the demobilized combatants were associated with the CNDD-FDD, 
followed by the FAB (Boshoff, 2006: 148). These numbers demonstrate that the major parties 
were both committed to the process. This strengthened the institutional capacity of the UN: the 
support of the organization focused mainly on demobilization. Because the CNDRR focused 
on demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration, disarmament is more difficult to measure than 
in the case of Sierra Leone and the DRC. The estimations are that most of the weapons are still 
in circulation (Banal & Scherrer, 2008: 43). At the end of 2005, only 5,640 weapons had been 
collected by the transitional government and by ONUB (Boshoff, ONUB Electoral Section & 
Vrey, 2010: 85). Even though the statistics demonstrate a relatively positive result of DDR in 
Burundi, the program experienced difficulties. Trust in the capabilities of the Burundian 
government and thus in the government agency coordinating the DDR program, the CNDRR, 
was low. While the CNDRR was expected to take responsibility to ensure national ownership, 
it often was incapable and inadequately trained to coordinate all implementing agencies. As a 
result, the implementing agencies were also unable to provide adequate support (Douma & 
Gasana, 2008: 7; Fuhlrott, 2007: 327; Willems, Kleingeld & Van Leeuwen, 2010: 14). This 
resulted in, for example, delays in reintegration support. In addition, political instability 
remained during the DDR program since political power was transferred in the 2005 elections. 
This instability also caused delays (Boshoff, ONUB Electoral Section & Vrey, 2010: 91; 
Douma & Gasana, 2008: 5; Rumin, 2012: 78). The DDR process was not without its obstacles, 
but overall, demobilization and reintegration efforts were relatively successful, while the 
success of the disarmament phase remains difficult to determine due to the lack of data. Overall, 
this reaffirms the degree of institutional capacity of the UN established as a result of the 
absence of conflict recurrence. 
Besides the general DDR success, the child-centered DDR program can also be 
categorized as successful, thereby improving the institutional capacity of the UN. The program 
demobilized 3,261 children, almost 10 percent more than expected. All of them were reunited 
with their families and 93 percent of the children received reinsertion assistance, while 79 
percent also received reintegration support (World Bank, 2010: 69). Overall, support to child 
combatants has been more extensive than to adult combatants. Child reintegration included the 
community as they were prepared for the return of the former child combatant. This was not 
the case for the adult DDR program, since the process focused on the individual and not on the 
community of the former combatants (Willems, Kleingeld & Van Leeuwen, 2010: 19). The 
Special Project for child soldiers was successful in providing demobilization and reintegration 
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assistance. Even though the child-centered DDR program was successful, it was subjected to 
the same challenges as the general DDR program. In addition, the CNDRR was not always 
able to deliver sufficient support in terms of vocational training opportunities, educational 
assistance, psychosocial support, etc. for child soldiers (Transitional Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program, 2005: 6; Willems, Kleingeld & Van Leeuwen, 2010: 20). The child-
centered DDR program succeeded in achieving its objectives, despite the challenges faced. 
UNICEF was primarily responsible for the program, and therefore, the institutional capacity of 
the UN can be viewed as relatively high.  
  To conclude, the UN was relatively successful in achieving its goals in Burundi. It was 
not the primary international agency to assist the general DDR program, but it proved to be a 
valuable partner in the child-centered DDR process. In addition, the warring parties mostly 
seem to be willing to cooperate and there was a relative peace to keep. Conflict has not recurred 
yet. The degree of institutional capacity attributed to the UN in Burundi is relatively high. The 
figure below presents a short overview of the results of the three case studies. 
 
Results of the dependent and independent variables 
 Sierra Leone DRC Burundi 
Dependent variable: 
institutional capacity 
High Low High 
Main explanatory variable: 
legitimacy 
High Low High 
Main explanatory variable: 
availability of resources 
Sufficient Sufficient Sufficient 
Main explanatory variable: 
symmetry of power 
High Low High 
Figure 4. Results.  
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
 
While the previous chapter presented the results of the three case studies and focused on the 
context and outcomes, this chapter concentrates on applying the theoretical framework to these 
results and illustrating the mechanisms involved in policy theory-driven evaluation. It 
examines how legitimacy, the availability of resources, and symmetry of power influenced the 
institutional capacity of the United Nations in the DDR programs in Sierra Leone, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi. It tries to show which one of the three 
external factors can explain the different degrees of institutional capacity of the United Nations 
in the three cases. Especially, it tries to demonstrate why the UN in Sierra Leone and Burundi 
has similar degrees of institutional capacity, while this is not the case in the DRC.  
 
4.1 Legitimacy 
As Chapter 1 illustrates, legitimacy can be assessed according to five criteria: the ongoing 
consent of democratic states, minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, institutional 
integrity and accountability and transparency. The focus in this section is on the first four 
aspects, since the last factor also determines the degree of symmetry of power and it is more 
appropriate to discuss it in the third section. To confirm the first hypothesis relating to 
legitimacy, the UN’s role should be viewed as more legitimate in Sierra Leone and Burundi 
than in the DRC, resulting in a higher institutional capacity.  
In the context of Sierra Leone, the DRC, and Burundi, ongoing consent of democratic 
states can be translated to the amount of support the UN missions received, in particular of 
Western states. The data in the previous chapters illustrate that the United Kingdom was 
decisive in the conflict resolution in Sierra Leone. The intervention of the British demonstrated 
a strong commitment to the warring parties and it gave the UN mission time to transform into 
a strong peacekeeping operation and partner in the DDR program. In contrast, Western support 
in the DRC was limited. No Western power showed the same degree of support as the United 
Kingdom in Sierra Leone. Strong commitment was lacking and it did not substantiate the 
existing support structure of MONUC. The same holds true for Burundi: it did not enjoy the 
same level of commitment by Western states as Sierra Leone. Therefore, the ongoing consent 
of democratic states was strong in Sierra Leone while weak in the DRC and Burundi. The 
involvement of Western countries alone does not result in high institutional capacity. 
Therefore, it is a sufficient but not necessary condition of legitimacy for the institutional 
capacity of the UN support structure, thereby passing the smoking-gun test of process tracing.  
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 The second criteria of legitimacy, minimal moral acceptability, is an easy criterion for 
the UN to fulfill as the promoter of human rights. In Sierra Leone, there is no data that 
demonstrates that the UN committed serious injustices. It presented itself as a neutral actor and 
supported all parties equally in the DDR program. In contrast, MONUC is subjected to limited 
injustices. Even though they are not as major as human rights violations, MONUC was 
involved with the military in the DRC. It fought alongside the FARDC against the FDLR. This 
damaged its minimal moral acceptability to a certain extent. In addition, its institutional 
integrity, the fourth criterion of legitimacy, also came under pressure through this action. To 
be a legitimate actor, the UN needs to be viewed as legitimate by all parties and intensively 
cooperating with one side endangers the UN’s minimal moral acceptability and institutional 
integrity. The neutrality of the UN, which is one of its founding principles, was apparent in 
Sierra Leone, but the UN’s role in the DRC is questionable in that regard. There is no data for 
Burundi that demonstrates that the UN was engaged with the military as it was in the DRC. It 
was responsible for observing and monitoring the reform of the military but it did not closely 
cooperate with one military faction. Because of the limited degree of injustice and partiality in 
the DRC conflict, minimal moral acceptability and institutional integrity are viewed as 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the institutional capacity of the UN support structure, 
thereby passing the hoop test of process tracing.  
 In addition to ongoing consent of democratic states, minimal moral acceptability and 
institutional integrity, comparative benefit determines the degree of legitimacy an international 
actor enjoys. This means that the UN is the preferred international organization to support the 
DDR program. This was the case in Sierra Leone where UNAMSIL took the lead. However, 
in the DRC, MONUC played a smaller role as the World Bank was the primary international 
agency responsible for coordinating and assisting the DDR program. In addition, the same 
dynamic existed in child-centered DDR. In Sierra Leone, the NCDDR delegated the 
coordination of child-centered reintegration efforts to UNICEF. The UN agency, in turn, 
coordinated all the NGOs and distributed the funds to NGO projects that supported the 
reintegration of former child combatants. In contrast, in the DRC, UNICEF and NGOs had 
equal status and CONADER maintained primary responsibility of the child-centered DDR 
program, in cooperation with the World Bank. Similar to the DRC, the DDR program in 
Burundi was also managed by the World Bank, instead of the UN. However, UNICEF was an 
important actor in the child-centered DDR. The agency acted as the coordinator of all 
implementing NGOs and the SNES, while it was also responsible for the distribution of the 
funds in Burundi. This shows that the degree of comparative benefit was higher in Sierra Leone 
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and Burundi than in the DRC. However, even though other organizations were preferred over 
the UN agencies, more important problems existed in the DRC because of a lack of 
coordination and management by CONADER. Therefore, this evidence is a sufficient but it is 
not believed to be a necessary condition for the institutional capacity of the UN support 
structure, thereby passing the smoking-gun test of process tracing.  
As indicated earlier, the last aspect of legitimacy, accountability and transparency, is 
discussed below in the section on symmetry of power. The UN in Sierra Leone enjoyed strong 
Western support, the mission maintained minimal moral acceptability and institutional 
integrity, and the UN agencies were preferred over other agencies. In contrast, in the DRC, 
Western commitment to the conflict and to the DDR program was limited, the mission 
intensively cooperated with the military, endangering its minimal moral acceptability and 
institutional integrity, and the World Bank was preferred over the UN agencies. In Burundi, 
there was no strong Western support, but the minimal moral acceptability, institutional integrity 
and comparative benefit was high. Therefore, the UN can be regarded as a more legitimate 
partner in Sierra Leone and Burundi than in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since the 
UN was more successful in Sierra Leone and Burundi than in the DRC, this confirms the first 
hypothesis that legitimacy influenced the institutional capacity of the UN support structure. 
The UN was better able to respond to the challenges regarding DDR and child-centered DDR 
in Sierra Leone and Burundi than in the DRC, resulting in higher institutional capacity.  
 
4.2 Availability of resources 
In the context of DDR, availability of resources means mostly financial contributions to the 
three phases of the program, the military contribution of the UN peacekeeping operation 
present and the use of expertise of the international community. Sierra Leone, the DRC, and 
Burundi reveal similar results. In all three cases, the deployment of military personnel reached 
(almost) full strength. Funds were provided by the World Bank. The UN advised the national 
governments and committees for DDR. This last aspect proved to be more difficult in the DRC 
than in Sierra Leone and Burundi. UNAMSIL and the NCDDR worked closely together and 
can be viewed as partners. NCDDR took advantage of the expertise provided by UNAMSIL. 
In addition, the child-centered DDR program was supported by the Child Protection Office, 
providing information and giving advice on the issues relating to child soldiers. In the DCR, 
MONUC also included a Child Protection Office, but the relationship between MONUC and 
CONADER was much more difficult. CONADER suffered from weak management and 
coordination skills, but was not open to training by UN agencies, such as UNICEF. In Burundi, 
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there is no mention of the deployment of a CPA in the resolutions on Burundi. However, 
UNICEF provided expertise for the child-centered DDR program. Interestingly, DDR in Sierra 
Leone and the DRC focused on disarmament and demobilization, while the Burundian DDR 
program focused on the latter two components. There is no data for Burundi that shows how 
this different focus affected the availability of resources, mainly funds, for the reintegration 
process, which severely lacked financial resources in Sierra Leone and the DRC. The UN 
support structure in Sierra Leone and Burundi presented a slightly better case in terms of 
providing expertise to the national coordinator of the DDR program. However, the limited 
availability of data makes it difficult to generalize the conclusions. The data that is available 
demonstrates that the influence of the availability of resources on the UN’s institutional 
capacity presents neither a sufficient nor necessary condition, thereby passing the straw-in-the 
wind-test. As a result, the second hypothesis on resources is disconfirmed. 
 
4.3 Symmetry of power 
Symmetry of power is determined by three factors: participation, accountability and fairness. 
Participation refers to ownership. In the DDR context, this means ownership by the national 
party, but also ownership by the international community. In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL was the 
primary international actor involved and the mission took ownership of the DDR program, both 
for adult and child combatants. In addition, the NCDDR proved to be a valuable partner. It was 
responsible for the national DDR program and it was a relatively capable actor, although there 
were signs of corruption. In comparison to the Sierra Leonean case, the DRC seems to follow 
the same structure at first sight. CONADER is the responsible national actor for the DDR 
program and it supported by the World Bank as the primary international actor. However, an 
in-depth analysis of CONADER demonstrates its weaknesses. The national committee lacked 
the ability to oversee the DDR program, both for adult and child combatants. It suffered from 
corruption, mismanagement, lack of funds and a lack of political will. In Burundi, national 
ownership was not as strong as in Sierra Leone but it was sufficient to promote the institutional 
capacity of the UN. Not all main parties were involved and the DDR program was only able to 
succeed when the CNDD-FDD signed the Global Ceasefire Agreement (2003). However, the 
UN was able to achieve most of its objectives. The examples demonstrate the importance of 
the national ownership. Without a capable national organization and participation of the 
warring parties, it seems almost impossible for the UN to attain a high institutional capacity. 
However, the Sierra Leonean case does not illustrate a perfect case of national ownership. 
Therefore, participation is viewed as a sufficient but not necessary condition for the 
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institutional capacity of the international organization involved, either the UN or the World 
Bank. This condition passes the smoking-gun test of process-tracing.  
 Besides participation, accountability influences the degree of symmetry of power. 
Accountability involves transparency and informing the actors about the decisions made. In 
the context of the UN’s role in the DDR program, accountability can be best categorized by 
the degree of corruption involved in the process. There is no data that shows that the UN was 
engaged in corruption or lack of communication. However, in all countries, the DDR program 
for both adult and child soldiers was corrupted to some extent. In Sierra Leone and in the DRC, 
respectively the NCDDR and CONADER were involved in the corruption practices. In 
Burundi, trust in the government and the CNDRR was also low. They were not always capable 
of executing the DDR program in a sufficient manner. However, there is no clear evidence that 
points to corruption, even though it can be assumed that corruption occurred due to the low 
level of trust and weak government institutions. The problem with the accountability indicator 
is that data on this issue is hard to obtain, which could be considered as a lack of transparency. 
Taking this into account, however, the data that is provided on Sierra Leone, the DRC and 
Burundi shows consistency across cases. Therefore, the result demonstrate that accountability 
is a neither necessary nor sufficient condition for institutional capacity. It thereby passes the 
straw-in-the-wind test of process-tracing.  
 The last aspect that determines the degree symmetry of power is fairness, which can be 
categorized into two types: procedural and substantive fairness. The former concentrates on 
the equality of the institutional structure, while the latter focuses on the impartiality of the 
outcomes and the general symmetry of power, influences and resources within the 
organization. Both types are relevant for the analysis of the UN’s role in DDR. In Sierra Leone, 
all parties were involved in the peace process and were also included in the DDR process, both 
for adult and child combatants. This proved to be more difficult in the DRC, because of the 
higher number of involved parties. Not all armed groups were included in the peace and DDR 
process. Procedural fairness in Burundi was relatively high. Almost all main parties were 
involved and the UN treated them the same Therefore, procedural fairness is higher in Sierra 
Leone and Burundi than in the DRC. The procedural fairness is reinforced by a degree of 
substantive fairness in Sierra Leone. The DDR process for adult combatants involved parallel 
disarmament. Two armed groups were disarmed at the same time. There is no data for the DRC 
on parallel disarmament or whether all armed groups were involved in the process. In Burundi, 
the main armed groups participated in the DDR program, although there is no data on whether 
the same process of parallel disarmament was utilized. The Sierra Leonean case and the 
The Institutional Capacity of the United Nations 
 
	
49 
Burundian case provided procedural and substantive fairness, while the DRC case did not. 
Therefore, fairness can be viewed as a sufficient but not necessary condition, thereby passing 
the smoking-gun test of process-tracing.  
  
To conclude, the analysis demonstrates that legitimacy and symmetry of power are the most 
important external factors influencing the institutional capacity of the UN. The two aspects 
were more visible in the case of Sierra Leone and Burundi than in the DRC. This relates to the 
institutional capacity of the UN: both Sierra Leone and Burundi enjoyed a relatively high 
degree of institutional capacity, while the DRC did not. Regarding the availability of resources, 
the UN will be unlikely to accomplish a high degree of institutional capacity without sufficient 
resources. However, the similarity of the results shows that even with enough resources, the 
degree of institutional capacity can be low. Therefore, it cannot explain the differences in 
institutional capacity between the three cases analyzed. The results, however, also point to 
another aspect that impacts all three external factors possibly influencing the institutional 
capacity of the UN: political will. The absence of political will on every level, ranging from 
the local to the international level, is destructive for the institutional capacity of the UN. 
Without political will, the UN will never be able to gain legitimacy, sufficient resources and 
symmetry or power and will therefore never achieve a high degree of institutional capacity. 
This is particularly visible in the DRC. Even before the program started, it had no chance to 
succeed because there was no peace to keep in the DRC. All parties involved lacked political 
will to find a peaceful solution to the conflict because multiple sovereignty continued to exist. 
Conflict was preferred over peace by the armed groups and the international community did 
not seem concerned enough to strongly intervene. This was different in Sierra Leone where all 
parties, armed groups and the international community, were willing to participate and invest 
in a peace process and subsequently in the DDR program. This resulted in compliance by all 
involved parties and proved to be decisive in a relatively successful completion of the DDR 
program. Despite their differences, UNAMSIL, the RUF and the Sierra Leonean government 
had the same goal in mind: disarm, demobilize and reintegration as many (child) combatants 
as possible to transition the country from a warzone to a peaceful society. The case of Burundi 
followed the example of Sierra Leone. Most of the warring parties, except Palipehutu-FNL, 
were ready to lay down their arms and sign peace agreements. This reinforces the importance 
of political will to end the conflict. On the national and local level, there was enough political 
will by the warring parties to end the conflict and to implement an effective DDR program. In 
contrast, the involved groups in the DRC never took the agreements seriously, which resulted 
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in a lack of compliance. The international community, in turn, never showed the same degree 
of strong commitment as in Sierra Leone. Therefore, the peace process and the DDR program 
for adult and child combatants in the DRC was never as decisive as in Sierra Leone and Burundi 
to prevent conflict recurrence. Political will is arguably the most important aspect that 
determines the institutional capacity of the UN. Without widespread political will, the 
international community can deploy peacekeeping operations, participate in DDR program and 
focus on child soldiers, but it will not succeed. Therefore, this analysis demonstrates that 
besides legitimacy and symmetry of power, political will is a major external factor influencing 
the institutional capacity of the UN. It is the basis for a high institutional capacity of the UN, 
after which it can focus on legitimacy and symmetry of power to expand this capacity.  
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Conclusion 
 
Maintaining international peace and security: the UN has been involved in this practice since 
its founding in 1945. It is one of the most difficult challenges the UN faces, but through 
peacekeeping operations, the organization tries to create lasting peace in conflict-ridden 
countries. One of the methods the UN uses to achieve this objective is supporting Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration programs. These programs fall under the responsibility of 
the national governments, but international organizations such as the UN often help in 
accomplishing its goals. DDR programs are a crucial component of a country’s transition from 
war to peace since it aims to transform former combatants into civilians. This is believed to 
break the conflict trap. The reintegration of child soldiers proves to be even more important 
because children are vulnerable and pose a greater post-conflict security threat due to their 
inclination to reengage in armed groups. This research is based on the idea that reintegrating 
combatants, especially child combatants, through the DDR programs leads to lower chance of 
conflict recurrence. However, the process does not always result in success. While the literature 
shows that there are many explanations for this, this study has looked at the institutional 
perspective, namely the institutional capacity of the United Nations in supporting the DDR 
programs, i.e. the ability of the UN to implement its rules, procedures and structures to achieve 
the expected results.  
 The theory points to three main aspects that influence institutional capacity: legitimacy, 
the availability of resources, and the degree of symmetry of power. The results demonstrate 
how this theory can be applied to the institutional capacity of the UN in DDR programs. Sierra 
Leone and Burundi experienced a relatively high degree of institutional capacity, while the UN 
had a low degree of institutional capacity in the DRC. The case studies reveal that legitimacy 
and symmetry of power are the most important determinants for a high degree of institutional 
capacity of the UN, confirming the first and third hypotheses. Legitimacy focuses on ongoing 
consent of democratic states, minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, institutional 
integrity and accountability. Western support can substantially increase the institutional 
capacity of the UN, but the case of Burundi demonstrate that even without it, the UN can 
succeed. The most important aspect of legitimacy proved to be comparative benefit. The UN 
needs to be preferred over other organizations to maintain a high institutional capacity. This 
was the case in the DDR program for adult and child combatants in Sierra Leone and in the 
child-centered DDR program in Burundi. The DRC DDR program was dominated by the 
World Bank and the UN had equal status to NGOs. In addition, symmetry of power concerns 
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participation, accountability and fairness. Participation measures national ownership and the 
commitment of all parties. Without a degree of participation, the institutional capacity of the 
UN remains low. Regarding fairness, procedural fairness proves to be decisive because it is 
closely associated with participation. It results in high institutional capacity. Substantive 
fairness was visible in Sierra Leone because of the parallel disarmament and the widespread 
participation of all armed groups. Burundi also demonstrated widespread participation, while 
data was not available for the DRC. Therefore, the findings point to a positive influence of 
substantive fairness on institutional capacity, but it cannot be substantiated with evidence that 
shows that the DRC had limited substantive fairness, thereby resulting in low institutional 
capacity. The data on accountability is limited. The available data shows similar results in terms 
of accountability and transparency. The last external factor under study, the availability of 
resources, has limited influence on the institutional capacity of the UN, disconfirming the 
second hypothesis. Similar to the accountability indicator, the data on resources was constant 
across the cases, which makes it unable to explain the differing institutional capacities of the 
UN in Sierra Leone, the DRC and Burundi. Interestingly, a common aspect of all three external 
factors in this research is the importance of political will. Without the will of the warring parties 
to engage in peace negotiations, to comply to the DDR program and to support the country’s 
transition from war to peace, the UN will not be able successfully assist the national DDR 
program. In other words, there needs to be a peace to keep and there should not be multiple 
sovereignty. This overlapping principle of political will needs to be present in the country for 
the UN to gain a high degree of institutional capacity.  
Even though the research uses triangulation to improve the validity of the arguments, 
there are limitations to the current research. First, there are general limitations to the research 
design utilized, namely the chance of measurement error and random variation. Therefore, a 
third case study, Burundi, was added to limit these possible errors in the research. Second, the 
data consist mainly of secondary sources and primary documents. The findings could be 
substantiated by conducting interviews with people involved in the institutional practices. 
However, this was not possible for the current study due to time issues. Therefore, it is strongly 
recommended that further research focuses on testing the findings of the current study by 
conducting interviews. In addition, the data on the availability of resources and accountability 
was limited. The influence of these aspects on institutional capacity should be further 
investigated due to the consistency across the cases. Moreover, to limit the scope of the 
research, three case studies were chosen that experienced similar DDR program but differing 
main explanatory variables. However, it should be taken into consideration that the conflict in 
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the DRC was much more complex than the conflicts in Burundi and Sierra Leone. Even though 
the conflict in the DRC is still characterized as a civil war, it has a strong regional character. 
This thesis has tried to present convincing evidence through a comparison of the three cases. 
However, a perfect comparison is difficult due to the complexity of the DRC conflict. This 
perfect comparison is also complicated by the fact that Sierra Leone experienced strong UN 
leadership, while the DRC experienced strong leadership by the World Bank. Burundi can be 
categorized as a mix of UN and World Bank leadership. It could point to the argument than the 
UN might be better suited for DDR support than the World Bank because of its success in 
Sierra Leone and partly in Burundi, but this claim needs to be subjected to further research. 
Finally, it should be noted that the issue under examination is complex and wide-ranging. To 
limit the scope, this research concentrated on the influence of three possible external factors on 
the institutional capacity of the UN. However, it should be recognized that these aspects are 
not the only explanations and that there are many more possible alterative explanations for the 
institutional capacity of the UN. The theory utilized was appropriate in the current study, but 
institutional capacity goes beyond legitimacy, the availability of resources, and the degree of 
symmetry of power as the influence of political will demonstrates. These three aspects are just 
three out of many possible explanations. 
 This study could be a stepping stone for further research on institutional capacity in 
general and on the UN’s institutional capacity in DDR programs specifically. Avenues of future 
research could focus on the role of resources or accountability in the DDR programs, but it 
could also expand on the influence of political will as an external factor or other external 
factors. In addition, other countries with DDR programs could be examined to confirm or 
disconfirm the findings of this thesis. Moreover, the current examination of institutional 
capacity is based on qualitative data, even though quantitative date is used to substantiate the 
findings. It would be interesting to compare these results to a large-N design study about 
institutional capacity of the UN and the DDR programs to make the necessary steps towards 
generalization. In addition, future research could focus on comparing several international 
organizations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations. It could analyze its institutional 
capacity and the external factors influencing this capacity in programs such as the DDR 
programs. Lastly, besides external factors, the influence of internal aspects on the institutional 
capacity of the UN can also be a subject of future studies. 
 To conclude, legitimacy and symmetry of power are the most important external factors 
determining the institutional capacity of the UN. Incorporating these concepts into the design 
of the UN’s role in DDR programs results in higher institutional capacity. This means that the 
The Institutional Capacity of the United Nations 
 
	
54 
UN is to support a country’s transition from war to peace and that the chances of conflict 
recurrence in the country are decreased, paving the way for sustained peace. These 
developments are important steps for the UN towards accomplishing its overall goal of 
maintaining international peace and security.  
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